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ABSTRACT 
The asymmetrical threats that challenge U.S. national policies are not large 
standing armies, but rather individuals who seek to usurp and coerce U.S. national 
interests.  The nature of today’s threats call for the U.S. military to change from finding, 
fixing, and destroying the enemy’s forces to identifying, locating and capturing rogue 
individuals in order to destroy networks.  To counter such threats, the USG will have to 
quickly and efficiently identify and find these targets globally.  
Unfortunately, no military doctrine, framework or process currently exists for 
finding and apprehending these Persons of National Interest (PONIs).  Since military 
planners and intelligence analysts are neither educated nor trained in the methods or 
procedures necessary to find and capture PONIs, this thesis will propose a methodology 
to do so.  This involves, the development of an analytical process, and an organizational 
structure and procedure to identify and locate PONIs. Consequently, the United States 
government’s ability to prosecute the war on terrorism today, and to find and apprehend 
PONIs in the future, depends on its ability to develop and institutionalize a 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the September 11 attacks, the United States government has drastically 
shifted its priorities to the Global War on Terror.  Billions of dollars have been spent 
setting up various counterterrorist centers.  Academics and analysts alike have written on 
the perplexing issues surrounding terrorism and terrorists.  Most of this work focuses on 
how to attack and dismantle networks, the root causes of terrorism, the psychology 
behind suicide bombers, etc.  However, the most important aspect in the war on terror—
finding and apprehending Persons of National Interest (PONI)—has received virtually no 
attention.  Little research has been conducted on the nature of manhunting, and this is 
what the U.S. military, justice, and intelligence communities are currently engaged in.   
One problem for the U.S. military is that its traditional rules for conducting 
combat operations do not necessarily apply to the non-conventional threats posed by 
terrorists.  It is nonsensical to assume that the same methods, frameworks, and strategies 
used by military planners to defeat a conventional enemy’s combat power apply to 
finding a clandestine fugitive.  Further, today’s military has numerous new tasks that it 
must perform in the Global War on Terror, and current U.S. military doctrine does not 
address many, let alone all of them.  This thesis offers a first step in defining the 
problems specifically associated with manhunting.  In this thesis we develop a 
framework, methodology, and process to assist military planners and intelligence analysts 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Since 11 September 2001, the United States military has been actively pursuing 
terrorists and disrupting the terrorist support infrastructure.  Although the U.S. 
government (USG) saw initial successes in Afghanistan, the senior al-Qaeda leadership—
namely Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri—have avoided capture.  With all the 
technological resources available to the United States government and her allies, we are 
still unable to locate and capture these elusive men.  In fact, Usama bin Laden has been 
on the FBI’s Most Wanted terrorist list since the bombings of the United States embassies 
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya in August 1998, and he has yet to be 
brought to justice.  
In October 2001, the United States Military sent Special Operations Forces into 
the Northern territories of Afghanistan to assist the Northern Alliance with the overthrow 
of the Taliban regime and the destruction of al-Qaeda.  In December 2001, the hunt for 
bin Laden and al-Qaeda led to numerous military operations in the Tora Bora mountain 
region.  Unfortunately, many senior al-Qaeda leaders, to include Usama bin Laden, were 
thought to have escaped to the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan.  Since 
January of 2002, there has been little evidence to indicate where bin Laden might be.  
Most analysts believe that he is either dead or being supported by various tribes in the 
Northwest Frontier Province.  Recent military operations conducted by the Pakistani 
Army have further dispersed the remnants of al-Qaeda.   
The clandestine and decentralized nature of terrorist cellular networks has made it 
difficult for military units and intelligence agencies to identify and locate known 
terrorists.  The success of U.S. military operations in 2001 and 2002 disrupted much of 
al-Qaeda’s infrastructure and forced al-Qaeda to conduct small-scale contingency 
operations.  Even infamous terrorists like Usama bin Laden are difficult to locate when 
they are forced to go underground and rely on networks, which are hidden from spy 




A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
How do military planners and intelligence analysts search, locate, and capture 
fugitives who operate within networks that offer support, cover, and security? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a) What makes it difficult for the U.S. military to capture fugitives? 
b) What differences exist between the hiding characteristics of 
fugitives who operate in a cellular network and those who don’t have any 
formalized organizational structure? 
c) What processes do other governmental agencies use to find 
fugitives? 
d) How do social networks, behavior patterns, and environmental 
factors impact the fugitive’s decision-making? 
e) How can search game theory be applied to manhunting? 
f) What deception and denial techniques do fugitives use to mask 
their activities? 
g) Is there a method to detect active deception by fugitives?  
B. METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis we define different types of manhunts, categorize fugitives, and 
identify manhunting strategies using historical cases and analytical methods.  Our 
research draws on interviews with law enforcement personnel, private investigators, 
bounty hunters, military planners, and intelligence analysts as well as our own personal 
experience in the field of special operations and intelligence analysis.  Our collective 
experience includes conducting operations in multiple geographical regions, to include 
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans.  We have 




command to strategic operations at the theater combatant command level.  We have also 
supported manhunts for specific individuals in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In the course of our research, we have reviewed the manhunting doctrine of the 
Department of Defense, FBI, U.S. Marshals, and CIA to include all methods, processes, 
tactics and techniques used by these agencies to capture fugitives.  We then apply 
analytical tools from various disciplines—social network analysis, probability and 
statistics, game theory, and linear algebra—to develop our framework.   
C. ORGANIZATION 
In Chapter II, we identify the problems military professionals face when hunting 
individuals, the lack of a framework, and the U.S. military’s success rates in past 
manhunting campaigns.  In Chapter III, we analyze the theoretical principles of 
manhunting and discuss the strategies a Person of National Interest will use to evade 
capture.  In this chapter we also address the three elements that influence manhunts—
detectability, exposure, and maneuverability.  Additionally, we define a set of 
independent variables, and briefly discuss hunting strategies to include still-hunting, 
stand hunting, drive hunting, stalking, trapping, and calling.  
In Chapter IV we look at contextual and behavioral characteristics that influence 
the fugitive’s course of action and describe various investigative techniques that military 
professionals can use to locate fugitives.  In Chapter V we examine individual deception 
and denial, and show how it is fundamentally different from military deception.  In this 
chapter, we also consider other elements to be aware of—such as biases—which may 
adversely impact the investigation.  For instance, the proper analysis of anomalies can 
help the hunter determine whether information is true or false, which may in turn prevent 
the unnecessary investigation of false leads.   
In Chapter VI we concentrate on the development of a manhunting method, to 
include a framework and analytical process to better understand the complexities inherent 
to successful manhunting.  In this chapter we outline a process to help reduce the scope 
and complexity of searching for individuals.  Chapter VII provides a basic understanding 
of social network theory and adapts many of these concepts to the practical application of 
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building social templates for revealing a fugitive’s likely comfort zones.  Chapter VIII 
proposes a manhunting organizational structure and develops an organizational process 
for hunting PONIs.  Finally, Chapter IX is our summary chapter, in which we also 
identify areas for further research, and discuss the limitations of our methodology.   
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Manhunting is about identifying and locating known and unknown persons of 
interest.  However, this thesis will often refer to manhunting in terms of identifying and 
locating terrorists.  Readers should bear in mind that manhunting encompasses much 
more than just hunting terrorists.  For instance, the techniques we describe can be applied 
to finding war criminals, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or finding deposed leaders such as 
Saddam Hussein.  For the purposes of this thesis, manhunting will be associated with 
identifying and locating terrorists because finding terrorists is the most pressing concern 
for the military today.   
In addition, easy access to lethal technologies enables individuals and non-state 
actors to proliferate weapons of mass destruction.  The increasing threat from terrorists 
requires the United States government to enhance its ability to identify and locate these 
non-state actors.  Yet, no doctrine or formalized process currently exits to enhance the 
United States government’s ability to apprehend these individuals.  Although we possess 
a counterterrorist capability to fix and neutralize the threat, we lack the information 
gathering processes to identify and find the terrorists before they act.  As a result, the 
United States government’s (USG’s) ability to prosecute the war on terrorism, and to find 
and apprehend high value targets in the future depends on the USG’s ability to develop 
and institutionalize a comprehensive strategy which includes developing a manhunting 





II. MANHUNTING  
A. INTRODUCTION   
The purpose of the United States military is to defend the constitution of the 
United States by deterring war and, if necessary, by achieving victory in battle through 
overwhelming combat power.  However, the complex nature of the transnational terrorist 
threat has created a new challenge for military planners and intelligence analysts.  The 
traditional rules used during the cold war to protect the United States and her allies have 
changed.  Many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by military units to 
defeat the communist threat in Europe are ineffective in the war on terrorism.  During the 
cold war era, military commanders were rarely tasked to find, fix, and destroy specific 
individuals.  Although senior enemy leaders were targeted on various occasions, counter-
leadership operations (CLO) were characterized by conventional military-style attacks 
against enemy headquarters or through the use of special operations forces to kill or 
capture select prominent and visible individuals. 
Generally speaking, the U.S. military does not conduct manhunts.  There are, 
however, a few historical cases when the U.S. military has conducted a manhunt to 
apprehend a specific individual who was not a government agent.  The 1916 expedition 
into Mexico to capture Pancho Villa is a case in point.  Pancho Villa, acting on his own 
cognition, attacked the city of Columbus, New Mexico.  Mexico’s lack of government 
control fostered internal instability, which enabled Pancho Villa to conduct a cross-border 
raid.  The Villistas posed a significant threat to U.S. citizens along the U.S.-Mexican 
border.  The United States government, at the time, had no other recourse available 
except to use the military to conduct a massive search for Pancho Villa and his bandits.  
The Pancho Villa expedition is a rare case and not a military norm.   
Like Pancho Villa, today’s non-state actors represent a significant threat to 
regional security.  In many cases, the host nation’s ability to maintain internal stability is 
hindered by local popular support for the non-state actor.  Some governments knowingly 
allow non-state actors to operate from within their borders.  In these cases, when a  
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government cannot or will not contain a transnational threat emanating from within its 
borders, the U.S. government may have little choice but to conduct operations to protect 
its citizens.   
Yet, throughout history, finding and apprehending an individual from another 
sovereign nation has rarely been considered a national security issue.  Only recently has 
the military increased its role in apprehending international war criminals, terrorists, and 
drug traffickers.  The U.S. military’s limited experience conducting manhunts has created 
a doctrinal, legal, and procedural void.  No established set of systems or procedures has 
been formalized to specifically address manhunting within the confines of military 
operations.  Consequently, the U.S. military approaches manhunting according to 
established processes created for conventional battle—find, fix, and destroy.  Yet, the 
very nature of finding individuals differs considerably from finding a unit on the 
battlefield.  Identifying and locating an individual requires significantly different 
analytical methods and processes.   
B. FRAMEWORK 
Although today’s military may have some capabilities within its repertoire that 
can be used for manhunting, it has not developed specialized systems or the 
organizational capacity to find Persons of National Interest.  The traditional rules for 
conducting combat operations against a Soviet invasion of Europe do not apply to the 
non-conventional threats posed by individual terrorists.  For example, the principles of 
war were developed to frame the strategies and tactics for victory.  Exploring the nine 
principles of war—mass, objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, 
simplicity, security, and unity of command—should immediately suggest why the U.S. 
military has difficulties conducting manhunting operations.  For instance, combat units 
that maneuver on the battlefield may use cover and concealment to protect and mask their 
signature, but eventually these units must go on the offensive to gain the initiative to 
obtain victory.  To exploit the initiative, an enemy may use surprise to strike at a time, 
place, or in a manner that is not expected.  However, an individual who wants to avoid 
capture will never go on the offensive.  His goal is to constantly evade, avoid direct 
contact, and thwart apprehension at a decisive place and time.  Furthermore, in many 
historical cases (as with the hunt for Pancho Villa), employing the principle of mass has 
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resulted in less than spectacular results.  Since, the visible signature of large maneuver 
units allows the fugitive to evade before being detected.  
Further complicating the problems of finding fugitives are the doctrinal tasks 
military commanders use to accomplish their mission.  Traditionally, military 
commanders are often directed to find, fix, and destroy the enemy.  Intuitively, a 
commander would assume that these tasks should also apply to finding individuals.  
However, the tasks of identifying, locating, and apprehending means the hunter may need 
to first identify the fugitive’s support infrastructure before a fugitive can be found.  
Identifying the fugitive’s clandestine network of support may be very difficult because 
relationships that develop within “small world” networks are not usually transparent to 
outside observers.  That is, relationships can date back several years or even decades and 
there may not be any observable indicator of recent connectedness.   
Not only are the tasks associated with apprehending fugitives different, but the 
decision making process to capture fugitives may also be distinct from traditional military 
operations.  The military decision making process and the investigative process are very 
similar in form, but vastly different contextually speaking.  The military decision making 
process (MDMP) is used to analyze the effects of terrain and weather, and the enemy’s 
most likely and most dangerous courses of action (COA) based upon his capabilities.  
These enemy situation templates (SITTEMPS) enable the commander to develop a 
course of action suitable to accomplishing his mission and intent.  On the other hand, the 
investigative process is a step-by-step procedure that attempts to connect bits of 
information together to solve a problem or prove a hypothesis.  Comparatively speaking, 
there is a predictive process based on operational norms, while the investigative process 
is an approach used to connect pieces of a puzzle.  While both processes have merit in 
their particular fields, they are very hard to effectively combine when the military lacks 
the investigative techniques necessary for conducting manhunts.    
1. The U.S. Military’s Effectiveness in Manhunting 
The argument presented thus far is that the military framework established to win 
battles may not be applicable for finding Persons of National Interest.  We see this most 
clearly when we examine cases like the Pancho Villa expedition, the pursuit of Persons 
8 
Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs), the hunt for Usama bin Laden and other members of 
the al-Qaeda network, and the search for Saddam Hussein. 
In 1916 the United States government launched a military expedition to bring 
Pancho Villa to justice for his attack on Columbus, New Mexico.  President Wilson 
announced that an “expedition will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single 
object of capturing him and putting a stop to his [Villa’s] forays” (Boot, 2002, p. 189).  
The Pancho Villa expedition was led by General John J. Pershing who initially had a 
force of 4,800 men with which to search the Mexican state of Chihuahua.  Later, Pershing 
would add additional forces—approximately 12,000 men.  Yet, General Pershing’s forces 
were only marginally successful.  The search would span 94,000 square miles over rough 
terrain (Boot, 2002, p. 192).  “The punitive expedition killed 135 Villistas, wounded 85, 
captured 19” (Boot, 2002, p. 202).  Interestingly enough, the most successful engagement 
was not conducted by an infantry or cavalry regiment, but by ten men led by General 
Pershing’s aide, 2nd Lieutenant George S. Patton Jr.  This event came about in the 
following manner: Patton was sent to buy supplies for the men.  During this foray, he 
visited San Miguelito Rancho, which was owned by one of Villa’s generals, Julio 
Cardenas.  Patton then deployed his 10 men and three vehicles to block all exits to the 
ranch.  Patton walked up and knocked on the front door, only for General Cardenas to 
attempt to escape by horseback.  Cardenas, unsuccessful in his attempt to leave the ranch, 
was shot by Patton (Boot, 2002, pp. 197-198).   
Under his own initiative, Patton, who was just a general’s aide, accomplished a 
task—to apprehend a person of national interest—that a large cavalry regiment had little 
success in fulfilling.  Although this small group of ten men was able to capture one of 
Pancho Villa’s most trusted generals, Pancho Villa himself was never caught by General 
Pershing’s forces.  For the U.S. military, the experience in Mexico never contributed to 
the development of any type of military procedure, doctrine, method, or organization 
specially developed for manhunting.  
Recent military manhunts for high value targets (HVTs) have continued this 
tradition of only marginal success.  For instance, the table in Appendix A, taken from the 
International Criminal Tribunal’s (ICTY) website, depicts the current status of Personnel 
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Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs) from the Former Yugoslavia.  A total of 112 
individuals have been indicted, with 27 individuals either cleared, charged, or killed 
during an attempted arrest (one individual’s indictment wasn’t complete when he died, 
which explains the statistical discrepancy).  Altogether, 84 personnel have been indicted 
for war crimes in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.  Of these 84, 25 indictees are still 
at large, 9 were released pending trial, and 50 are in custody or serving a sentence.  22 
indictees surrendered to the appropriate forces, with 6 PIFWCs surrendering as an 
indirect result of the economic pressure placed on Serbia by the United States.  
According to the ICTY’s data (last updated in October 2002) the U.S. military was 
responsible for the direct apprehension of 5 individuals over a six year period, which 
means the US. Government caught fewer than 6% of the PIFWCs (ICTY, 2002).  
Unfortunately, statistics are much more difficult to come by for OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and the hunt for bin Laden and the al-Qaeda Network 
(AQN).  At the 2004 Republican National Convention, President George W. Bush stated 
that “More than three quarters of the al-Qaeda’s key members and associates have been 
detained or killed” (Isikoff & Hosenball, 2004).  This statistic probably refers to the 
number of known al-Qaeda members prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 
of 2001.  However, due to the lack of information on the composition of al-Qaeda’s core 
leadership the exact numbers are questionable, and can not be corroborated because U.S. 
intelligence officials have not provided any data to substantiate the 75% statistic.  
Officials have also failed to explain the methodology behind calculating this percentage.  
For various reasons, both the data and methodology have been classified, so it is hard to 
evaluate the USG’s measure of effectiveness in apprehending these terrorists (Isikoff & 
Hosenball, 2004).  What is known is that Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are 
still at large, and they have been so for almost 10 years.  This alone calls into question the 
United States’ capabilities to apprehend rogue individuals.   
However, there has been greater success in Iraq than in either Bosnia-
Herzegovina or Afghanistan.  Not only has OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 
successfully accomplished the mission of capturing Saddam Hussein, but this operation 
has netted 44 of the 55 individuals, or 80%, of the persons of interest on the Combined 
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Joint Task Force Seven’s (CJTF-7s) 55 Most Wanted list (Multi-National Corps Iraq, 
2004).   
We would argue that this is in large measure because finding the remnants of the 
deposed government leadership in Iraq has been easier than finding transnational al-
Qaeda members or, for that matter, PIFWCs in sovereign foreign territory.  The freedom 
of movement and the broad authority of a conquering army are greater than those of a 
force deployed for peacekeeping or stability support operations.  When a conquering 
force is able to quickly secure a country and cut off points of exit, the invasion force has 
a strategic advantage in the manhunting game (i.e. the Saddam Hussein case).  Often the 
deposed leadership tries to retain power well past the point where individuals can 
successfully avoid capture.  For example, Saddam Hussein and most of the senior Iraqi 
leadership waited entirely too long before attempting to seek refuge in a neutral or 
supportive country.  Their avenues of escape, which where open during the initial stages 
of the war, quickly closed as the invading force seized Baghdad.  In comparison, some 
reports indicate that al-Qaeda’s leaders and their families began repositioning themselves 
well before the United States invaded Afghanistan.  For instance, The London Sunday 
Mirror reported that Abdullah bin Laden—the son of Usama bin Laden—and Abdullah’s 
mother Sabiha, brother Malik, and sister Samina, jetted to the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) from Pakistan on 15 October 2001, just one week after the aerial bombing 
campaign was launched against the Taliban and al-Qaeda (FBIS, 2001).  Comparing and 
contrasting these two cases, one could argue that the senior leadership of a government is 
more concerned with maintaining power, whereas a terrorist organization’s priority is 
survival.   
2. The Role of Frameworks in Conceptualizing Problems  
The U.S. military’s effectiveness in manhunting, described in the previous sub-
section, calls into question the U.S. military’s ability to conceptualize manhunting.  The 
apparent lack of a suitable framework may be one reason why the U.S. military only 
achieves occasional successes in manhunting operations.  That is, without a framework to 
properly conceptualize the problem most of the pertinent information that impacts on 
manhunting could be easily overlooked or mislabeled.  Further, the military’s 
development of systems and tools which are thought to assist in solving the manhunting 
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problem could in fact exacerbate the situation—leading to excessive costs, misleading 
information, and false conclusions.  Only with a proper framework can a problem be 
properly identified.  The following example serves to illustrate this point.  
In Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richard Heuer (Heuer, 1999) explains 
how judgment is affected by the lack of a proper framework.  Heuer describes an 
experiment in which experienced mechanics were given a diagram (“fault tree” in 
psychology) that showed them all the reasons why a car would not start.  “The tree had 
seven major branches—insufficient battery charge, defective starting system, defective 
ignition system, defective fuel system, other engine problems, mischievous acts or 
vandalism, and all other problems—and a number of subcategories under each branch” 
(Heuer, 1999).  The first group of mechanics was shown a complete tree and tasked to 
identify 100 reasons for the car not starting.  The mechanics were then asked to associate 
each one of the 100 causes with one of the seven major branches of the fault tree.  The 
second group of mechanics, meanwhile, was shown a partial fault tree with only four 
major branches (to include a branch labeled “all other potential causes”).  The goal of the 
experiment was to determine how sensitive the test subjects were to incomplete 
information. 
The theory behind the experiment was that if the mechanics were sensitive to the 
missing information then the second group would choose the “other problems” category 
for faults associated with the three missing branches.  But, the results of the experiment 
showed that the “other problems” category was chosen only half as often as predicted, 
indicating that the mechanics who were shown the incomplete tree were unable to fully 
recognize and incorporate into their judgments the fact that some of the causes for the car 
not starting were missing.  When the same experiment was run with non-mechanics, the 
effect of the missing branches was even greater (Heuer, 1999).  This experiment 
illustrates how the lack of a framework can prevent an accurate in-depth analysis of a 
problem, suggesting that, the lack of a framework for finding fugitives may also prevent 
military planners from adequately addressing the unique problems associated with 
capturing fugitives.   
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For example, take the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) hunt for Abu 
Sayyaf (ASG) leader Khadaffy Janjalani.  On 5 July 2003, Khadaffy Janjalani and 30 
Abu Sayyaf members on board two outrigger boats arrived in Barangay Libua, 
Palimbang town, Sultan Kudarat in Southern Mindanao.  The AFP immediately 
dispatched the 601st infantry brigade to the area to capture Janjalani.  Yet, during the 
601st’s five-month deployment to the region, Janjalani was able to avoid capture while 
operating in a very narrow and limited 10 km by 6 km zone.  Even though the 601st 
conducted MDMP and developed friendly courses of action to apprehend Janjalani, the 
AFP still failed to apprehend him (Espejo, 2003).   
The AFP framed the problem in conventional military terms, and too heavily 
relied on technology based intelligence collection platforms provided by the United 
States Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).  Upon receiving U.S. 
intelligence information, the AFP began its planning cycle, arrayed its units, determined 
likely avenues of approach, and maneuvered its forces to engage the target.  However, the 
601st brigade and JSOTF-P never fully understood the fugitive’s strategies to avoid being 
captured, and never looked to the Abu Sayyaf group’s possible deception techniques.  
These oversights were contributing factors in the AFP’s failure to apprehend this rebel 
group.  Further, the absence of a manhunting framework led the 601st brigade to the 
incorrect conclusion about why the AFP was unable to capture Khadaffy Janjalani—the 
lack of timely actionable intelligence.  Although U.S. and Philippine military planners 
blamed their failures on slow intelligence, closer examination reveals that key planners 
did not understand fugitive apprehension strategies.  The 601st brigade was never able to 
operate inside the fugitive’s decision cycle and predict Janjalani’s next move.1  
The lack of a framework or the wrong framework often leads planners, decision 
makers, and analysts down avenues that fail to resolve the problem or accomplish the 
mission.  Our argument is that military planners can’t develop an effective course of 
action to capture a person of national interest when the fundamental principles behind 
                                                 
1 The co-author of this thesis, Matthew T. Nilson, was the JSOTF-P’s Liaison Officer with the 601st 
Brigade from August to October 2003, and was responsible for coordinating all U.S. intelligence support at 
the Brigade Level.  The discussions addressing the 601st Brigades operations are based on the author’s 
personal observations.   
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manhunting are misunderstood.  In the following sections we develop a framework based 
on these principles. 
3. Two Forms of Manhunts 
Two fundamentally different problems exist in hunting Persons of National 
Interest: 1) finding and apprehending known persons of interest, and 2) identifying and 
apprehending unknown criminals, terrorists, or their supporters.  Finding and 
apprehending known individuals leads or amounts to a competition between hiders and 
finders.  However, in the case of unknown criminals or terrorist elements what becomes 
essential is finding latent perpetrators and facilitators by squeezing the most out of 
incomplete information.  These individuals are generally in fixed locations, but strive to 
conceal their relationships and activities.  Clandestine networks may be difficult to track 
and identify using technical collection means, primarily because these technical systems 
are designed to detect observable signatures, yet they can be easily deceived by false 
signals or overwhelmed by excessive signals. 
Further, for these technical collection means to work they must be able to detect 
patterns of behavior and interactions between individuals.  Few technical systems are 
designed to identify how relationships are formed between individuals, when these 
relationships were formed, or how strong these relationships are or have been.  
Meanwhile, if these relationships are unobservable using technical means, the network is 
able to function below the surface, which offers it still greater freedom of movement.   
Yet, through a thorough historical investigation of known facilitators, a deliberate 
investigative campaign can help identify numerous nodes in a fugitive’s criminal support 
network.  Instead of following the signal, the investigator follows the story.  He identifies 
incongruities between the stories of different actors and forms theories based on these 
incongruities.  The investigator uses more art then science in his manhunting endeavor.   
4. Categorizing Fugitives 
To gain a better understanding of the specific fugitive being sought, one needs a 
system of categorization.  Through our analysis of numerous case studies we have 
developed three preliminary categories: Type-A—individual criminals; Type-B—persons 
who are members of an organization, and Type C—deposed government leaders.  For 
instance, fugitives like Eric Rudolph the 1996 Olympic bomber or Mir Amal Kasi, the 
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individual who fired upon CIA headquarters, are characteristic Type-A fugitives.  These 
individuals are not part of any nefarious organization or government entity.  Yet, they can 
destroy infrastructure and disrupt governmental functions.  They may or may not fall 
under the responsibility of local police or federal authorities, but are generally a 
responsibility of law enforcement.  The interesting phenomenon behind Type-A fugitives 
is that they can find sanctuary from prosecution in foreign countries.  Type-A persons of 
interest usually do not pose a direct threat to national security, but as technology evolves 
these same individuals may become better positioned to challenge national security in the 
near future.  The key that separates Type-A from either Type-B or Type-C individuals is 
that they don’t have an organization or robust support structure supporting or guiding 
their activities.  Unless they are independently wealthy, their resources tend to be limited.  
They are predominantly concerned with survival, and not with achieving any strategic 
objective or maintaining power. 
Type-B Persons of National Interest are individuals associated with a nefarious 
non-state organization or network.  Type-B individuals include members of crime 
syndicates or mafias, insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and drug cartels.  
Individuals who operate in organizations or networks of this type can be further 
subdivided into those who belong to the leadership core, operators, or supporters.  
Hunting individuals who belong to criminal organizations, terrorist networks, or 
insurgent groups may be considered as both a law enforcement activity and a mission to 
protect national security.  Manhunts for such individuals may fall within the scope of 
different government agencies to include the Department of Justice, Department of 
Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.  The Pancho Villa expedition is one 
example where the U.S. military conducted a manhunt for a terrorist/guerrilla group.  
What truly separates the Type-B individuals from the Type-A lone actor is that 
organizations have objectives and a robust support structure, whereas individuals have 
limited support structures and the finite goal of survival.  Group survival is important for 
Type-B Persons of National Interest, but to be successful the group must recruit members 
and it must have an objective besides pure survival.   
Type-C individuals are government leaders, their cronies, and their supporters.  
Saddam Hussein, Radovan Karadic, and Manuel Noriega are classic examples of Type-C 
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Persons of National Interest.  What differentiates a Type-C from a Type-A or Type-B 
individual is that the Type-C person is in power and controls or uses government 
resources.  Also, these individuals typically have armed forces and government assets at 
their disposal to protect them and their regime.  Although these individuals may be 
indicted, law enforcement is usually unable to make an arrest without the help of larger 
national assets—law enforcement does not have the military might to bring these 
individuals to justice.  The Type-C person typically requires manhunts conducted by 
military or paramilitary units and executive level approval must be secured before this 
type of operation is conducted.  The nature of the Type-C individual also differs in an 
important regard from Type-A or Type-B Persons of National Interest (PONI) and is 
exemplified by Saddam Hussein.  That is, individuals in power do not want to lose 
power.  Leaders tend to hold on to their status well after their regime has fallen and, 
fortunately for the manhunters, the leader’s decision to evade is often made well after the 
invading military has gained significant area control.  
The comparison between these three different categories of Persons of National 
Interest (PONI) accentuates another factor that affects the location and apprehension of 
individuals—control of the search space.  Type-A, B, and C individuals interact 
differently with their environment.  In some cases, the person of interest has sovereign 
control; in others the hunter has control.  The ability to control the search space is critical.  
In Iraq, for instance, the environment went from not being controlled by coalition forces 
to being semi-controlled.  An environment can be considered either permissive, semi-
permissive, or non-permissive for the hunter.  The same applies to the PONI.  It is often 
difficult to measure or quantify how permissive an environment is and for the purposes of 
manhunting this may not be necessary.  What is more important is to understand the 
relationship between the hunter, the evader or PONI, and the environment.  That is to say, 
who controls the search space?  If the hunter conducts a search that is external to his area 
of responsibility then he may be at a disadvantage.  On the other hand, if he controls the 
area of search his chances of success increase. 
In many of the most pressing cases, the United States does not have jurisdiction 
over the area where these persons of interest are hiding, which means these individuals 
live and operate in a country that may or may not assist the U.S. government with their 
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apprehension.  Sometimes the U.S. government has an extradition treaty with the country 
where the fugitive is, and extraditions serve as a useful means for law enforcement 
agencies to apprehend individuals who flee.  But, for extraditions to be successful the 
individual must be caught, and this often assumes that the foreign government has the 
resources, dedication, and political will to find and apprehend the fugitive.  In some 
situations, the political context is such that a foreign government may actually assist in a 
rendition; a rendition is the informal transfer of a prisoner to another country.   
In some cases, and especially in Type-C manhunts, the U.S. government chooses 
a course of action that changes the rules of the game.  For instance, the hunt for Saddam 
Hussein would normally be characterized as a non-permissive manhunt, but after the U.S. 
invasion and defeat of the Iraqi military, the United States gained military control of Iraq.  
Hence, the U.S. military had internal control of the search space where Saddam was 
hiding, which increased the likelihood of capture.  In comparison, Radovan Karadic 
former leader of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb 
Army General wanted for war crimes, are believed to be living in southeastern Bosnia or 
Serbia.  According to a BBC report, “The UN’s chief war crimes prosecutor, Carla Del 
Ponte, said in September 2001, however, that she thought he [Mladic] was in Serbia” 
(BBC, 2002).  This was later confirmed by a high-ranking Serbian government official 
who remains anonymous.  If, in fact, these former Bosnian Serb leaders are in Serbia then 
SFOR, the stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, can not be said to fully occupy the 
search space and this search has to be considered a non-permissive search.   
Table 1, on the following page, offers a graphic illustration of different types of 
manhunts.  The table shows the type of person being pursued, and the type of control the 
U.S. government had in each case.  Type-B individuals are further labeled as leaders, 
operators, or supporters, since their operational characteristics impact the manhunt 
differently. 
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Table 1. Manhunting Characterization Table (Case Study Examples) 
 
 





Type-A: Individual Mir Amal Kasi Eric Rudolph 
 
Type-B: Organizational al-Qaeda Symbionese Liberation Army 
I.  Core Leadership Usama bin Laden Donald DeFreeze 
II. Operators Muhammad Atef William Harris / Patty Hearst 
III.  Supporters Yassin al-Qadi 
(financier) 
Miki & Jack Scott, rented a 
house to the SLA 
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III. MANHUNTING THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES  
As discussed in the previous section, military combat pits two adversaries against 
each other on a linear battlefield so that they can defeat or demoralize each other by fire 
and maneuver.  In such situations, both combatants are either actively or passively 
engaged in battle to gain a tactical, operational, or strategic advantage.  In the 
competition between two enemy combatants, the goal is to win the battle by defeating the 
adversary—both combatants must confront to win.  However, a manhunt scenario differs 
in that each player’s strategy is different.  The fugitive always wants to avoid capture, 
while the pursuer always wants to engage and capture the target—the pursuer must 
confront to win, whereas the fugitive must evade to win.  In this competition between the 
evader and pursuer, the evader has no requirement to win, just not to lose.  Although, the 
relationship between the evader and pursuer may appear similar to that of combatants—in 
that there exists a competition between two adversaries—the underlying principles are 
different.  The fugitive always wants to be obscure, unattainable, and ambiguous, 
whereas a combatant wants to be obscure and unattainable only until he can engage his 
adversary on favorable terrain.   
Since the nature of the game is different, an exploration into the factors that 
influence the competition is needed.  Examining the variables that govern the relationship 
between the hunter and the hunted will lead to a framework that should yield a logical 
methodology for conceptually understanding the strategic, operational, and tactical 
dilemmas associated with the search and capture of Persons of National Interest.  This 
analytical framework should also further our understanding of the three basic 
apprehension-avoidance strategies used by Persons of National Interest, and assist in the 
development of counter-strategies.   
A. MANHUNTING STRATEGIC ELEMENTS 
Manhunting strategies are defined according to three elements: detection, 
exposure, and maneuver.  Each element addresses a component in the process of tracking, 
locating, and capturing a fugitive.  These elements are composed of independent 
variables that frame the relationship between the fugitive and hunter, and can be used in 
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various models to help develop measures of effectiveness and identify systems that may 
not be producing the desired results.  
The lack of any clear statistical data hinders much of the research in this area.  
However, an investigation into the basic components of a manhunt should point us to in 
the right direction.  In this chapter we analyze the two basic functions of manhunts—
detection and apprehension.  We begin with the final operational phase of any 
apprehension—the maneuver phase.  Next, we address the governing principles of 
detection.  We do not address many of the more humanistic methods of capturing 
individuals here (i.e. use of informants, trust, and betrayal).  Those issues will be 
discussed in Chapter IV (Investigative Methods and Techniques).  For now, we 
concentrate on the “science” and not the “art” behind manhunting.        
B. MANEUVER 
The end-state of any manhunting scenario is the apprehension of the individual.  
The fugitive’s capture occurs in either a stationary or dynamic state.  That is, the 
hider/evader is either caught in a fixed location, such as a compound, or he is moving to 
avoid capture by some means of transportation.  Similarly, the hunter can be either 
stationary in an ambush position waiting for the PONI to move into the “kill zone” or the 
hunter can actively track him.  In either case, both the hunter and PONI are in a dynamic 
or static state.  We can describe individuals in this spatial relationship as being fixed or 
mobile.  If the PONI is fixed, he must either reduce his signature to avoid detection or 
increase his protection to avoid capture.  The criteria ‘fixed’ and ‘mobile’ help describe 
the positional relationships between the two actors. 
These criteria are particularly useful to consider when going after a Type-B 
individual.  This is because Type-B individuals belong to pre-existing organizations.  If 
the PONI must maintain physical contact with at least one component element, and if the 
element or elements are dispersed over a vast area, the PONI’s inability to move will 
directly hinder his operations or activities.  The operational requirements for a Type-B 
individual influence whether he has to move to maintain control.  Even if he does not 
have to move, he must have some method of communication to relay directions or 
information to other members.    
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When searching for a PONI the issues of ‘fixed’ versus ‘mobile’ are very 
important.  The hunter must understand both his and the fugitive’s constraints and 
limitations in terms of fixity and mobility.  In many cases, the hunter, especially in a 
hostile or semi-permissive environment, is limited in his methods of movement and is 
forced to remain in a quasi-fixed position.  Similarly, the PONI can also be stuck in a 
fixed position depending on his capabilities, organizational structure, visible signature, 
and available resources.  Additionally, an immobile PONI is much more difficult to 
detect than a highly mobile individual because the hunter’s eye—especially when 
enhanced by technical means—can detect motion.  Mobility generally increases the 
visibility of the target, thus improving the hunter’s ability to detect the PONI.  
(“Detectability” will be addressed in greater detail later in this chapter.)    
We can also express this mathematically.  At any given time (t) the PONI and 
Hunter are located at a defined location (L).  If the PONI is stationary at L1(t1) and the 
Hunter is stationary at L2(t1) than the PONI can not be caught at time (t1).  An 
apprehension is only feasible when the target and hunter are at the same location at the 
same time.  If, on the other hand, the target remains fixed at L2 for a duration of (t2-t1), 
and the Hunter moves to L2 over that same duration (t2-t1), then the Hunter should 
apprehend the target at L2(t2).  In other words, two fixed subjects at two different 
locations will never meet.  Although this concept is rather basic, the derivations when 
either one or both actors are mobile have significant implications in manhunting 
operations.  These concepts of mobility and fixity, and their relationship are depicted in 













Figure 1.   Fixity and Mobility Concept Chart 
The concepts underlying mobility are paramount in the apprehension of a target, 
and the analysis of mobility can provide exceptional insights into the identification, 
location, and course of action pursued by a PONI.  Questions related to the PONI’s 
mobility are as follows: can he move, how fast can the he move, how far can he move, 
what is his method of movement, when can (or does) he move?  The answers to these 
questions help create a template for developing a course of action to assist in his 
apprehension.  
Coincidentally, basic deer hunting strategies incorporate similar concepts.  For 
instance, deer hunters employ stand hunting, still hunting, stalking, calling, driving and 
trapping to increase the probability of shooting a deer.  In stand hunting, deer hunters 
analyze the terrain and the normative behavior patterns of the deer to determine the deer’s 
likely avenue of approach.  Next, the deer hunter places a deer stand or hide in a location 
that provides excellent observation over the deer path.  With luck the deer will walk 
down the path and the hunter hill shoot his prey.  In this scenario the hunter remains fixed 
while the deer is mobile.  This technique works best when the target is active in a given 
area, and the hunter has enough time and patience to wait.  (Hunting Methods, 2005)  
Stand hunting offers many advantages and disadvantages in comparison to other hunting 
strategies.   
“As the name implies, still hunting is walking stealthily through an animal's 
habitat, stopping frequently—sometimes for long periods—to scan and listen for game” 
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(Hunting Strategies, 2005).  Still hunting allows the deer hunter to actively pursue and 
kill the deer.  In this scenario, the hunter not only has to understand the terrain and the 
deer’s normative behavior patterns, but also the deer’s adaptive behavior patterns.  This 
strategy allows both the deer and the hunter to operate in a mobile state.  A variation of 
still hunting is stalking.  “The difference between still hunting and stalking is that when 
stalking, you follow signs leading to a particular type of game or group of animals, or 
close the distance to game already spotted” (Hunting Strategies, 2005).  There is also 
drive hunting.  In drive hunting, or flushing, the drivers push the deer to a point where the 
posters or hunters are positioned.  This is an excellent strategy to use when deer are 
hiding in thick brush.        
Two other methods to catch prey are calling and trapping.  Calling is the opposite 
of drive hunting in that calling lures the prey out of a concealed or secure location by 
incorporating different signals.  Here false signals are used by the hunter to trick the prey 
into revealing itself, whereas trapping is when the hunter baits or sets a trap and waits for 
the target to fall for the ruse.  The fundamental difference between calling and trapping is 
that calling requires active participation & presence by the hunter, whereas trapping does 
not.   
Direction and velocity are two variables that are important in stalking and still 
hunting because both the deer and the hunter are moving.  For the hunter to shoot a deer, 
he must be on a trajectory that interdicts the deer’s direction of travel, and he must have a 
velocity that will allow him to overtake his prey.  If both the deer and hunter follow a 
similar path, then the hunter must possess a greater velocity than the deer.  For the deer to 
successfully avoid being shot at, the deer must have either a higher rate of speed or 
change its direction of travel away from the hunter’s.  This will lengthen the distance 
between the deer and the hunter, and the greater the distance between the two the safer 
the prey will be.  We would argue that these same principles apply to manhunting.  
In the case of a mobile PONI targeted by a stationary hunter, the hunter must be 
able to predict the PONI’s avenue of approach.  The hunter must be very patient and 
confident in his abilities to predict the PONI’s movement patterns.  When the hunter is 
fixed, he can only capture the PONI when the PONI is at his location.  In this situation, 
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time is a relevant, but not a dependent variable.  In other words, for the hunter to catch 
the PONI he must know that at some time the PONI will be located in his space.  The 
time frame could be a few days, weeks, or years, but eventually the target will approach.  
How does the hunter know where the PONI will go?  For some hunters this determination 
is intuitive, but for most such a judgment is based on years of experience and intimate 
knowledge of the “game” being pursued.  As for targeting PONIs, this depends on the 
hunter’s ability to understand the effects of social and not just physical terrain and the 
PONI’s normative and adaptive behavior patterns. 
In cases where the PONI is hiding in a fixed position, the hunter must know 
where the PONI is and successfully move to that location without being detected.  Here, 
the key to success depends on locating the target.  In Hunting Down Saddam: the Inside 
Story of the Search and Capture, Robin Moore describes an individual referred to as “the 
source,” who gave U.S. military planners the type of detailed information necessary to 
locate Saddam Hussein (2004, pp 245-250).  Finding individuals in fixed bunkers or 
underground tunnels can be difficult by technical intelligence collection means.  In many 
cases, like that of finding Saddam, the key to successfully locating a fixed PONI is by 
gathering information from individuals close to the target.  
C. DETECTABILITY. 
Essentially, before a target can be caught the hunter must first be able to find him.  
The ability to find a PONI is directly related to the hunter’s ability to detect him.  
“Detectability” is comprised of two independent variables: visibility and acuity.  
Visibility is the size or strength of a signature left by the PONI, whereas acuity is the 
hunter’s ability to detect the PONI’s signature.  A signature can be visible, audible, 
electronic, or take on any other form so long as it is perceivable.   
1. Visibility 
Visibility is a very important component for both the hunter and the Person of 
National Interest.  If the hunter is very visible then the PONI will be able to maneuver to 
avoid the hunter by watching his activities.  If, on the other hand, the PONI is very visible 
then the hunter’s ability to identify, track, and locate the individual will be much easier.  
However, just because there is no visible signature does not necessarily mean that the 
fugitive is not present.  The PONI may be emitting a signature that is out of sync with the 
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hunter’s collection systems.  A useful analogy is the light spectrum, pictured below in 
Figure 3.   
 
Figure 2.   Electromagnetic Spectrum (from Nave, 2005) 
The human eye can only see a narrow band of the electromagnetic spectrum—the 
visible light spectrum.  The human eye cannot detect infrared or ultraviolet light, but that 
does not mean they do not exist—they are just not perceived by the human optical 
system.  Similarly, the intelligence spectrum only detects certain kinds of intelligence.  
For example, SIGINT detects signals intelligence; HUMINT detects human intelligence, 
and so on.  However, just because the SIGINT has not identified any signal to confirm or 
deny the presence of a PONI does not mean the PONI is not present.  It just means that 
the method of collection is out of phase with the PONI’s visible signature.   
2. Acuity 
Acuity is another important factor in the ability to detect and observe the target.  
The key for the hunter to detect the PONI is to increase resolution on his signature.  That 
is, the hunter must collect intelligence in the venue where the PONI operates, thus putting 
the hunter in phase with the PONI.  Type-B PONIs, for example, can send signals within 
their organization in a manner or at a time that is unobservable by the hunter.  Acuity is 
especially useful in conjunction with social network analysis.  Assuming that a PONI 
uses his social network to help him hide, the hunter can gain clarity on the network by 
identifying secondary and tertiary sources who know where the PONI is hiding.   
Analysis of visibility and acuity reveal certain relationships that impact how well 
the target can avoid being detected.  In many cases, the hunters have a sensory advantage 
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over the PONIs, but in others the hunter may in fact be at an intelligence collection 
disadvantage.  Figure 3 illustrates a case where the PONI has an intelligence collection 
advantage.  The PONI gives off a visible signature, which is represented by dark red.  
That represents how he is, while the hunter’s acuity is represented as light blue.  At no 
time does the light blue oval overlap the dark red ellipse—the hunter cannot see the 
PONI before the PONI sees the hunter.  This illustration applies to all types of 
intelligence collection.   
 
Figure 3.   Visibility Advantage Diagram 
More to the point, if the PONI’s intelligence collection systems use human 
sources to report information on the hunter’s movements, then the PONI can move before 
the hunter reaches his objective.  Further, if the hunter’s visibility to acuity ratio (V/A) is 
small then the hunter has a better chance of detecting the PONI, whereas a large (V/A) 
ratio means that the hunter has a better chance of being spotted first.   
Returning to the light spectrum example can help us further conceptualize some 
of the theoretical pitfalls of intelligence collection.  Every different type of intelligence 
collection means—HUMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and OSINT,—can be 
represented by a simple equation:  Visibility times Acuity equals Detectability or (v a)=d  .  
A detectability equation for signal intelligence collection is sig sig sig(v a )=d  , where sigv  
represents the visible signal of the PONI and siga  represents the acuity of the signal 
27 
collection system.  If either siga  or sigv  is equal to zero then the PONI will not be detected 
with that type of collection system.  That means, if the PONI is not emitting the type of 
signal that the collection platform is attuned to detect, than the PONI will not be seen by 
the hunter.  
This concept can further be graphically depicted by using overlays.  A visibility-
acuity overlay represents what the hunter can and cannot detect along various intelligence 
collection spectrums, and an example is shown in Figure 4.  For instance, the red squares 
represent different HUMINT sources that have access in a given area; the blue represent 
specific imagery of that grid square; the black squares represent intelligence collection 
dead zones.  Intelligence collection dead zones are areas where intelligence collection 
assets are unable to detect information.  Using such overlays would be extremely helpful 
for identifying shortcomings or holes in the intelligence collection plan.  Additional 
collection assets can then be directed toward these intelligence voids.   
 
Figure 4.   Visibility and Acuity Overlay 
D. EXPOSURE 
Thus far we have discussed the theoretical variables behind finding and catching 
individuals, but in many manhunts a third variable seems to describe the behavior of 
successful hiders.  In a competition between two individuals—hider and finder—a set of 
constraints shape the rules of the game.  These rules themselves restrict the players to 
certain allowable activities.  For instance, political and legal restrictions shape the 
individual’s activities, especially when legal constraints are present in the form of 
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jurisdictional boundaries.  Sovereign borders are among the greatest allies a PONI can 
have.  By understanding constraints and limitations associated with sovereignty, both 
hunter and PONI can identify countries and locations that can help them each achieve 
their specific objectives.   
The ability for the hunter to capture the PONI is only possible when both occupy 
the same bounded region.  Figure 5 below contains three regions—Regions A, B, and C.  
In this example, the hunter operates in Regions B and C, and the PONI operates in 
Regions A and C.  As long as both PONI and hunter operate outside the intersected 
Region C, then it is physically impossible for the hunter to catch the PONI.  If Region B 
and Region A do not intersect, then the two operational areas are mutually exclusive and 
an apprehension cannot occur.  Consequently, the goal of the hunter is to have as much 
access to the PONI as possible—ideally the hunter wants the PONI to flee to Region C at 
the same time the hunter should shrink the space in Region A.   
 
Figure 5.   Mutually Exclusive and Apprehension Zones 
Constraints and limitations expand beyond physical space to include time, 
resources, and capabilities.  Limited communications equipment or limited means of 
transportation can constrain the PONI’s avoidance plan, especially if the PONI is a Type-
B individual with operational objectives.  Other sets of limitations, which are difficult to 
measure or represent on a map, include religion, and ethnic or cultural constraints.  For 
instance, an Arab who operates in either Southeast Asia or Central Asia may have to 
adapt some of his behaviors to better integrate with the local populace.  These social 
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effects can constrain activities to certain geographic spaces just as legal or political 
constraints do. 
Lack of exposure helps to explain why many fugitives are not caught.  For 
example, Usama bin Laden either explicitly or implicitly understands the effects of 
exposure on his survival.  Bin Laden has a solid history of fleeing to countries that 
provide the sovereign protection he needs to avoid apprehension by the U.S. or Saudi 
Arabia.  Bin Laden has also maximized his survival in the past by manipulating the 
political environment to support his activities, and one of his greatest attributes is his 
ability to develop bonds of trust based on a shared cultural and/or religious identity.  
Currently, bin Laden is believed to be in the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan, an 
area that is controlled by tribes supportive of Usama bin Laden’s cause.  This social 
protection helps limit his exposure to Pakistani and U.S. forces.  To further address the 
variable of exposure, the following section will discuss exposure’s two independent 
variables: accessibility and vulnerability. 
1. Accessibility 
Many successful fugitives are able to avoid capture by minimizing their exposure.  
The fugitive achieves this objective by finding a location to which he has access, but the 
hunter does not.  Historically, the Underground Railroad served as a conduit to help 
slaves escape into Canada.  Today’s fugitives also flee to foreign countries where the 
political and legal constraints prevent their extradition.  Critical to our framework is 
determining accessibility in terms of the terrain’s effect on the hunter’s ability to gain 
access to the PONI.  If we return to Figure 4, only in Region C does the hunter have 
access to the PONI.  Therefore, only Region C provides the hunter with the opportunity 
to capture the PONI; this is the only location where the fugitive is vulnerable.  Therefore, 
we would argue that the hunter’s accessibility has to be considered a critical component 
in the fugitive’s vulnerability.       
2. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability refers to how susceptible the fugitive is to being captured.  If the 
hunter has no access to the PONI’s location, the PONI is not very vulnerable.  Referring 
back to Figure 4, we see that the fugitive is only vulnerable in Region C.  Additionally, if 
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a group or organization protects the fugitive then the fugitive is not as vulnerable to 
capture.  The extent of vulnerability can depend on many factors—political, economic, 
informational, and legal.  These factors define the relationship between the hunter and 
PONI and can be geospatial, and represented by operational zones.  These zones can help 
identify the optimal locations for the PONI to hide based on objective criteria.   
Constraints also create opportunities for both the fugitive and hunter.  Given the 
potentially dynamic nature of the game, the PONI may be vulnerable for only a limited 
time.  Thinking in terms of exposure is useful because it provides an analytical means to 
identifying optimal hiding and apprehension locations.  By measuring vulnerability and 
accessibility, the hunter can identify where the PONI can be caught, and identify the 
location(s) that maximize the PONI’s safety.  These theoretical principles allow hunters 
to systematically think through the strategies the PONI will likely try to use to survive.        
E. APPREHENSION AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES 
The PONI typically uses one of three general strategies: masking, maneuver, and 
disengagement.  The hunter, on the other hand, has five basic hunting strategies he can 
use: still hunting and stalking, stand hunting, drive hunting, trapping, and calling.  The 
masking strategy is probably the easiest for military personnel to understand because it 
incorporates the concepts of concealment and cover.  The PONI is using a masking 
strategy whenever he incorporates deception and denial into his operations.  The PONI is 
hiding or concealing his true identity, location, or support network, and uses denial by 
preventing the hunter from gathering information on the target.   
Masking is a strategy used by the PONI to reduce his visible signature.  Many 
different techniques can be used to mask a signal, such as noise and concealment. With 
noise, the hunter can not effectively identify the PONI because too much information 
overloads the hunter with data.  Concealment, on the other hand, is when the fugitive 
hides his true self.  For instance, international fugitives often create aliases and false 
documents to hide who they truly are. 
Deception involves many different techniques to prevent intelligence collection 
assets from gaining resolution on the fugitive.  The art of denial also plays a role in 
masking.  Unlike deception, denial involves the deliberate attempt by the fugitive to 
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prevent access to information.  That is, the fugitive prevents intelligence collection assets 
from penetrating his zone(s) of influence.  The key for the fugitive is to hide the truth 
while simultaneously showing a false positive.  Sir Francis Bacon, an English philosopher 
and intelligence officer, first introduced these ideas in 1625 when he wrote Essay No. 6, 
which outlined the concepts of simulation and dissimulation.  Dissimulation is “when a 
man lets fall signs and arguments that he is not that he is” (Bacon, 2001).  Simulation is 
“when a man industriously and expressly feigns and pretends to be that he is not” (Bacon, 
2001).   
The second, and arguably most effective, strategy used by PONIs to avoid capture 
is disengagement.  This is the safest strategy because it allows the PONI to operate in an 
environment that prevents him from being captured.  That is, he operates in an area that is 
not accessible to the pursuer.  The pursuer cannot gain access to this zone because of 
certain constraints and limitations, whether political, economic, legal, military, or 
geographic.  For example, the 601st infantry brigade from the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines—previously described in Chapter II—was limited in its search of the local 
Barangays.  In the Philippines, as in the United States, law enforcement officials have 
certain laws that govern their activities.  These laws are established to guarantee 
individual rights, and one of these involves the need for probable cause.  Before the AFP 
could search a suspected sympathizer’s residence, the AFP had to first show probable 
cause.  Unfortunately, these legal constraints enabled Janjalani to remain outside the 
realm of legal jurisdiction, while the Philippine military had to operate inside certain 
legal boundaries.  In this case, the 601st brigade was unable to capture Janjalani because 
legal limitations created a certain physical space—a sympathizer’s residence—to which 
the unit had no legal access.   
Here too, mobility helps the PONI to move at a time, to a place, or in a manner 
that is not expected by the hunter, which optimizes his ability to avoid being captured.  
For instance, the 601st brigade rarely conducted night operations, thereby allowing 
Janjalani and his supporters to operate freely from dusk till dawn.  Although imagery 
may have identified named areas of interest (NAIs) at 2200 hrs, by the time a unit from 
the 601st brigade arrived at that NAI the target had moved to another location.  The 
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effects of time enabled Janjalani and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to remain one step 
ahead of their pursuers.           
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IV. INVESTIGATIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 
In April 2005, the largest national fugitive dragnet ever, code named Operation 
FALCON, arrested nearly 10,500 fugitives in the space of just a week, the result of a 
massive push by the US Marshals service, the oldest of the federal law enforcement 
agencies.  Although the U.S. Marshals average over one hundred fugitive arrests each 
week, it wanted to see how much further it could go.  By joining with police from all 50 
states, involving more than 3,000 law enforcement officials with much of the muscle 
coming from 206 state law enforcement agencies, 302 county sheriff’s departments, and 
366 city police departments, the US Marshal service increased its apprehension rate by 
nearly eight times its usual weekly record.  Officials said fugitives were tracked in every 
state, including Puerto Rico and Guam (Dragnet nabs, 2005).   
In 2004, US Marshals apprehended over 36,000 felons and worked alongside state 
and local law enforcement to capture an additional 31,600 felons (Dragnet nabs, 2005).  
Several factors explain the success of the US Marshals.  First, the ability to coordinate a 
massive manhunt of this size requires thorough planning and exceptional intra-agency 
coordination across local, state, and federal levels because fugitives can be dangerous.  
Second, of those apprehended during Operation FALCON, 70 percent had prior arrests 
for violent crimes, meaning the Marshals already had a booking sheet filled out on each 
felon, detailing the arrestee’s name, address, bio-metrics, aliases, etc.  Furthermore, the 
standard operating procedure for first time felons prior to entering a detention facility is 
to have them fill out a questionnaire to determine which prison cells should be off-limits, 
given certain ethnic, gang, and religious affiliations.  The questionnaire is quite specific 
and probes about information on ethnicity, gang affiliation, languages, relatives, business 
acquaintances, girlfriends, wives, and children.  All the answers include a last known 
address.  First time offenders consider this questionnaire necessary to their survival 
because it is suppose to guarantee that they do not share a cell or floor with revival gang 
members.  But no less critical to the US Marshals’ success was the fact that their 
dedicated hunter teams are granted the authority to pursue a fugitive across jurisdictional 
boundaries.  The team is thus able to build intimate knowledge of the fugitive’s behavior 
at levels not possible in the past because of discrepancies that occur in case file hand-off.  
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These three significant factors provide the US Marshals the capability to apprehend 
fugitives at the local, state, and federal levels.  The US Marshals’ best practices, 
therefore, are worth our attention.  So, too, are those of the FBI, bounty hunters, and 
private investigators.  By studying an array of tactics, techniques, and procedures used by 
the most successful manhunters we should be able to develop an overall manhunting 
methodology.   Such an investigative process includes identifying possible hiding 
locations or pinpointing individuals in the fugitive’s support structure who can help 
locate wanted felons.  As America’s leading and most feared bounty hunter, Bob Burton, 
says, “ultimately, your search will lead you to the two stars of this trade: the fugitive and 
the Judas who betrays him” (Burton, 1990, p.30).   There is no reason to believe that 
some of these processes couldn’t also be applied to hunting down international terrorists.   
A. WHAT DO FUGITIVES DO? 
Commonalities exist among all types of manhunting, whether the hunter is 
pursuing a common criminal, international fugitive, or a terrorist.  Fugitives tend to 
choose one of three types of places to avoid capture.  A fugitive’s first choice is to 
typically ask friends or family to hide him and provide him money and support.  Second, 
he might gravitate to rural locations that are culturally familiar and where he feels 
comfortable blending in.  Third, fugitives sometimes settle down in a dense urban area 
where they can hide in plain sight.  Likewise, there are three patterns associated with 
avoiding capture and each fugitive typically will choose one of these.  Planned flight is 
used by a fugitive who has taken the time to recognize that he is a fugitive; either he 
committed a crime, jumped bail, or planned an escape.  Usually, this type of fugitive has 
coordinated for support and has access to identification cards, driver’s licenses, and 
passports.  In contrast, a sudden opportunity fugitive realizes he has the ability to flee and 
jumps at the chance without establishing a support mechanism to facilitate his escape.  A 
fugitive who has committed a crime of passion or is reacting to an event represents the 
third type.  The second and third type of fugitive does not have much time to consciously 
plan an escape or put support mechanisms into motion.  For this reason it is imperative 
the investigative response begin immediately.  Putting pressure on the fugitive causes 
stress, allows the hunter team to capitalize on the fugitive’s mistakes, and increases his 
risk of capture.    
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Typically a fugitive will try to eliminate, minimize, or conceal contact with his 
family, friends, and associates to increase his chances of success.  Initially, he will try to 
minimize his predictable and personal habits.  But, according to FBI psychological 
profilers at Quantico, every person has a public, a private, and a secret life.  ‘Public’ 
refers to how he presents himself in public, while ‘private’ is how he acts around friends 
and family.  More difficult to assess is an individual’s secret life, which is comprised of 
those things he does not want even his family to know about.   
The fugitive will try to minimize his level of risk by relocating to suitable areas 
with access to food and water, or at least areas that are favorable for his survival.  He will 
try to assimilate into the community by either blending in or making himself invisible.  
Often, fugitives engage in “risk management” strategies, trying to reduce the risk of 
being captured.  Several case studies reveal fugitives who have avoided contact with 
friends, relatives, and associates, thereby changing their behavioral patterns and 
decreasing their predictability.  Often fugitives who are successful will be financially 
prepared to move at a moments notice, often keeping $10,000 in every blazer or jacket so 
that no matter which coat they grab they can be gone in an instant.  Of the fugitives that 
do get captured, most are usually caught because they have a bad habit that can be 
exploited, or they leave an easy-to-follow signature.  Based on our interviews with law 
enforcement, most fugitives are captured thanks to their fondness for women, booze, or 
phones.   
B. THE BASICS 
Understanding the basics of investigative work allows the investigator to ask the 
right questions of an intelligence analyst and of potential sources.  Coordinating and 
conducting investigations through detecting and collecting physical evidence, and 
identifying, locating, and interviewing witnesses, victims, targets, and other third party 
sources of information to compile facts, evidence, and opinions pertinent to the 
investigation sounds like a lot of work, but this ultimately leads to locating the fugitive.  
However, even the first step, understanding what is in a name, can help narrow the scope 
of the search.  For instance, the Asian Gang Task Force Commander for the San 
Francisco police department must have the proper spelling of the fugitive’s name and the 
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way the full name is arranged (first and last name) prior to beginning his investigation in 
order to accurately search both US and Chinese databases for possible leads. 
Collecting information to build the fugitive’s profile, to include names and 
aliases, date of birth, a physical description, pictures or sketches, and documentation 
(passports, social security numbers, birth certificates, driver’s licenses, voter registration 
card, etc.) points the investigator in the right direction.  An investigator will start with the 
fugitive’s last known location and work backwards, interviewing friends, relatives, and 
neighbors, making sure to ask questions about the fugitive’s personal preferences, 
especially relating to women and favorite hang-outs.  By asking questions about the 
fugitive’s personal habits, routines, and preferred locations (home, office, and bars) the 
investigator is determining ‘comfort zones’.  Fugitives tend to return to these comfort 
zones or places of familiarity because they feel at ease and safe.  If the fugitive rides a 
Harley Davidson, frequents biker bars, and is covered in tattoos, then there is a 
reasonable chance he will not be found in an upper middle class section of town or 
playing golf at the local country club.  For a fugitive from the Middle East or Southwest 
Asia, understanding the tribe, clan, and village where the fugitive is from helps the hunter 
narrow the search.  Therefore, “fugitive recovery can be thought of as an information 
profession.” (O’Connor & Copeland, 2003, p. 94)  
C. MIR AMAL KASI CASE STUDY 
In 1993, Mir Amal Kasi, a Baluchi migrant, shot and killed two people and 
wounded three at the entrance to the CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.  The CIA 
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) asked the Islamabad station for help in recruiting agents to 
find Kasi.  A family-based group of Afghan tribal fighters, whose training began back 
with the CIA during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was hired to help in the search.  
The CTC Kasi cell secured budgetary approval and shipped cash, weapons, and 
communications equipment to Islamabad.  If Kasi was found in Pakistan, the Afghanis 
were to contact the CIA Station-Islamabad and case officers would then attempt to work 
with Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and police to make an arrest without 
revealing the existence of their paid Afghan agents.   
Initially, Kasi could not be located, but was rumored to be moving throughout 
Taliban- controlled Baluch province.  However, due to a deteriorating relationship 
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between ISI and the CIA, the CIA received little intelligence or access to Pakistani police 
resources in the Northwest Frontier Province.  Even if the CIA could locate Kasi through 
their own sources, they would probably not be able to apprehend him because of an even 
greater problem: the several centuries old clan and tribal protection code available to any 
Baluch in danger.  Although the CIA offered an enormous reward, under traditional 
honor and revenge codes; no one could turn Kasi over to the Pakistani police or even 
provide information of his whereabouts because of possible retaliation and tribal 
disgrace.  Nearly five years after the ambush of CIA headquarters, the CIA received a tip 
that Kasi was in a compound close to the Afghan border near his hometown, but the ISI 
would not attempt to arrest him.   
In the end, it was a Baluch man who walked into the US consulate in Karachi and 
announced he had information about Kasi’s whereabouts.  The source claimed that Kasi 
was under the protection of a Baluch tribal leader, but Kasi had fallen out of favor with 
the tribal leader so the tribal leader now sought the reward money.  An arrest plan was 
formulated between the FBI and the Baluch tribal leader.  While Kasi lay asleep in his 
hotel room the FBI kicked in the door and slapped handcuffs on the wanted felon (Coll, 
2004).   
With manhunting there are many heartbreaks and letdowns; it is “always darkest 
before the dawn.”  But being patient and persistent, with the ability to remain flexible and 
adaptable regardless of the situation, will always work in the investigator’s favor.  It is 
best to think creatively or “outside the box” and be imaginative, while still maintaining 
attention to detail.  The investigator must have the ability to develop, retain, and cross-
reference information from many sources and use all this information to maximum 
advantage.   For instance, being familiar with the level of military or survival training the 
fugitive might have is essential when trying to determine his ability to avoid capture 
when pressure is applied.  Keeping a list of telephone numbers, including those for his 
home, office, cell phones, wives, and girlfriends allows the investigator to track the 
fugitive through surveillance tagging devices when technology is available.  It is also 
important to know how many languages the fugitive speaks.  This helps in recognizing 
potential collaborators and comfort zones.  Cataloging special medical problems can 
likewise point investigators toward specific treatment requirements.  
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D. CARLOS THE JACKAL CASE STUDY 
 In his book, Hunting the Jackal, former Special Forces Sergeant Major and CIA 
operative Billy Waugh shares his 55 years of experience hunting international fugitives, 
including Carlos the Jackal (aka Illich Rameriz-Sanchez).  Key lessons Waugh conveys 
are: know the environment better than your prey; and know your fugitive, his operational 
profile, and behavioral patterns.  Pinpoint areas that are suitable for the fugitive, while 
establishing surveillance points to detect activity.  Establish positive identification of the 
fugitive, and detect and observe enabler activities and patterns.  After observing the 
fugitive’s activity patterns, determine where the fugitive has established safe houses and 
hide sites.  Begin surveillance on the fugitive’s safe houses, hide sites, and his enablers’ 
activities and homes.  Recognizing what habits and addictions the fugitive may have 
helps identify how and where he is vulnerable.   
It was, in fact, Carlos the Jackal’s excessive drinking that helped Billy Waugh and 
his team to find Carlos.  During a drinking binge, Carlos waved a pistol at a shopkeeper, 
and Sudanese authorities were forced to detain Carlos for disorderly conduct.  After 
Hassan al-Turabi agreed to Carlos’s release, Carlos made a phone call to his bodyguard, 
Tarek.  Tarek was then directed to come to Khartoum to protect/prevent Carlos from 
getting into any more trouble.  This event was the initial lead that started the search.    
When Carlos’s bodyguard arrived at the Khartoum airport, he was whisked away by the 
government’s secret police.  Unfortunately, the CIA team surveilling the airport was 
unable to follow the bodyguard.  The team then began searching places where foreigners 
were known to stay and, as luck would have it, the CIA team located Tarek in a hotel.  
The team immediately began surveillance on Tarek and identified the car that he drove.  
The other major break in the search occurred when Tarek’s car was spotted near a 
hospital.  The team immediately began surveillance on the hospital, which is where 
Carlos was finally spotted.  Unknown to the CIA team at the time, Carlos had genital 
warts, which required frequent treatments (Waugh, 2002, pp 156-177).  In this case, it 
was a string of events brought about by the fugitive’s addictive behavior which enabled 
the team to successfully locate the fugitive.   
Essential in finding Carlos was identifying his means of transportation, 
determining certain modes of travel available to the fugitive and which ones the fugitive 
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prefers allows the investigator to identify possible locations and patterns of movement.  
Technology can assist by providing a physical description of the fugitive even five, ten, 
and fifteen years after he has been sighted.  Often fugitives lose or gain weight based on 
their comfort level.  Carlos, for instance, gained 30 to 40 pounds in Khartoum and grew a 
thick moustache.  
E USAMA BIN LADEN: CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
In the case of Usama bin Laden, an investigator must analyze certain habits 
specific to his culture and ethnic background.  What does he prefer to eat and drink that is 
specific to an Arab from a wealthy family, and who might deliver those types of comfort 
items?  What are his sleeping habits?  Is he a family man or more nomadic, always 
needing to move?  How does he make or get money to support his lifestyle?  Does he 
tend to operate within his inner circle of friends, and does he only do business with those 
of the same ideological beliefs?  Is he known to operate on his own, or does he need all 
four wives and children near him?  Does he only feel comfortable in places he owns, or 
will he put trust and safety in other people’s hands?  Does he maintain ties with political 
and religious leaders?  These and many more questions help build the behavioral profile 
the investigator must have in order to narrow his search. 
After all information is collected, it is helpful to develop a graphic overlay, 
depicting countries that might offer this type of support.  Based on past tendencies and 
behaviors, Usama bin Laden is likely to be in a country with a weak regime, and where 
there is also ethnic and religious discrimination.  In the past he has based his operations 
in countries that have experienced recent political upheaval and are adjacent to one or 
more countries with ongoing strife.  Everywhere Usama bin Laden has lived, except 
Saudi Arabia, has had a poor quality of life and sub-standard infrastructure.  Templates 
that yield information about social factors like these can narrow the search and allow for 
further investigation.   
A very important step in the investigative process is to develop a base-line 
analysis for potential safe havens.  What are the social norms and day-to-day events in 
the targeted areas?  One way to think about this is to imagine Usama bin Laden as a big 
rock; the safe haven is a body of water.  Depending on how bin Laden entered that body 
of water would determine whether US government collection assets would see ripples or 
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waves.  What would make ripples and what would make waves?  Usama bin Laden often 
gravitates toward businesses or industries with which he is familiar.  During the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, bin Laden was nicknamed “the Engineer” because of his ability 
to contract construction companies to build roads, schools, and hospitals.  He is drawn 
toward public service and to assisting regimes to improve their infrastructure.  Many high 
profile fugitives are successors to the family business, or have heirs, and locating these 
can help investigators find the fugitive, or at the very least reveal not just enablers, but 
also business rivals who can also be critical sources of information.   
It seems paramount to build the behavioral profile of the fugitive before deciding 
to spend millions of dollars moving personnel to investigate, and before shifting 
collection assets to increase spying capability.  Figuring out what terrifies or worries the 
fugitive, and what his normative vs. adaptive behavior is, will also assist when the time 
comes to apply some external pressure to influence his decision-making.    
F. LOCATING THE FUGITIVE 
Databases like Choice Point or AutoTrack are an inexpensive way to begin the 
process of locating a person of interest inside the United States, but the same kind of 
information can be found overseas.  What makes these two systems unique is their ability 
to search public records nationwide and link together their many scattered bits and pieces 
of information into an electronic dossier, or profile, of an individual.  Just by searching 
for a name, the investigator can obtain current and past addresses, telephone numbers, 
social security number, date of birth and, more importantly, information regarding friends 
and neighbors.  Local law enforcement officers will usually not only conduct an 
investigation on a suspected criminal, but also run background checks on his neighbors.  
Most likely, the neighbors are aware of his criminal activity and may even be affiliated 
with this criminal behavior.  These databases cross-reference a massive amount of 
publicly available data, including addresses, driver’s licenses, property deed transfers, 
and corporate information (About AutoTrackXP, n.d.).  Most private investigators and 
bounty hunters use databases like these as a starting point for most searches because they 
are short term solutions given limited amounts of time and money.   
Both AutoTrack Plus and Choice Point contain over 4,000,000,000 records, 
collected and purchased from over 1,000 public and private sources.  These two 
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databases can provide real time searches by dialing into the databases of other computers 
to perform an extended search and provide instant up-to-date change of address 
information or directory information.  Public record databases require some training to 
use, but within an hour a search can provide an address and phone number for the 
fugitive and display a list of where and with whom he has been transacting business over 
the past several years.  One can refine the search to just a first or last name and an 
advanced search can even yield aliases or nicknames.  AutoTrack and similar databases 
deliver comprehensive information and allow the private investigator to browse through 
billions of current and historical records to locate wanted felons or witnesses.   
In high profile court cases, defense attorneys retain experienced private 
investigators to locate witnesses who are enrolled in the Federal Witness Protection 
Program.  The first place most private investigators begin their search is by accessing 
databases like Check Point, AutoTrack, and CDB Infotek.  Additionally, drawing 
together information from a fugitive’s prior arrest reports and prison records can provide 
leads which require further investigation.  Focusing on who visited the fugitive in prison, 
or who he called while in jail, aids in identifying potential enablers.  Another method is to 
track a fugitive’s children through a state’s Department of Education enrollment database 
to discover where they are living and which school they attend.  Putting the children 
under surveillance and observing who drops and picks up the kids at school can yield yet 
more leads.  In many cases, fugitives can be found living close to their children, or 
working at a job close by, in order to keep a watch on them and their mother.    
Before online public record databases became available to the public, private 
investigators routinely spent days in county courthouses researching and uncovering 
information that could pinpoint the fugitive’s location.  Collecting information from 
public, civil, and criminal records along with searching marriage and divorce records 
often uncovers critical information not found on a felon’s Failure To Appear (FTA) 
worksheet or the jail’s booking and property records.  The same goes for property 
records; if the fugitive has ever purchased real estate or personal property then there 
should be a record of sale and last known address.  Many of these same steps can be 
applied to international fugitives.   
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In most cases, especially in countries ruled by authoritarian governments, there 
are court houses or places where important documents and records are kept.  In remote 
areas, the village chief will often maintain these records in order to settle land disputes or 
family feuds.  Likewise, if the international fugitive ever attended a university, there 
should be a record of his attendance, along with rosters of his fellow classmates.  Getting 
to this information is a lot easier than expected because most universities have faculty 
from other countries who might provide this information for a small fee.   Finally, the 
FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which is a database that collects and 
discloses information from other law enforcement agencies about crimes and criminals, is 
a popular source of information for those in law enforcement.  The data contained in 
NCIC is supplied by the FBI, local, state, federal and foreign criminal justice departments 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003).  Every application, database, or piece of paper 
ever ‘touched’ may hold a critical missing piece to the puzzle.   
G. PURSUING THE FUGITIVE 
Persistence, patience, resilience, adaptability, and creativity are the keys to 
successfully pursuing a fugitive.  Quickly recognizing the fugitive’s avoidance strategies 
and capitalizing on mistakes made by him or his associates can help in closing in on his 
location.  Maintaining a level of awareness, keying in on patterns, and changes to patterns 
allows the investigator to be more aggressive in his search.  Effectively using traditional 
investigative techniques, and manipulating witnesses and informants, while also 
understanding and using technology to your advantage can only increase the level of 
success for the investigator.  Taking a proactive approach to pursuing a fugitive and 
applying intense pressure will often force the fugitive into the open.  The best 
investigators anticipate the fugitive’s mistakes—the pursuer may make many mistakes, 
but the fugitive need only make one mistake to be caught.  Therefore, the pursuer must 
always be ready to pounce.   
1. “Who’s Who in the Zoo” 
According to Los Angeles US Marshals Task Force Commander, Chief Inspector 
John Clark, it is all about knowing “who’s who in the zoo”.  The most important aspect in 
investigative work is identifying anybody and everybody who may be a potential source, 
analyzing the nature and depth of their relationships and their relationships with other 
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family members and business associates.  Key tasks include locating and interviewing a 
spouse, children, significant others (current and past), parents and siblings, friends, 
business and criminal associates, neighbors, vendors and, most important, the fugitive’s 
enemies.  Capitalizing on weaknesses or character flaws of those in the ‘zoo,’ the 
investigator can pit one against another.  Many times the spouse has no idea she is not the 
fugitive’s only love.  She may have much to disclose once she is told she is not the only 
one he slept with.  The same can be said about business partners or criminal associates; 
often they are unaware the fugitive has fled or even committed a crime.   
It is also important to adapt investigative techniques and approaches to 
circumstances, based on who is being interviewed or put under surveillance.  Prior to 
interviewing a witness or informant, the questions need to be prepared and likely 
responses anticipated.  Along with this it is critical to have counter-responses that can be 
supported with facts.  Because it is possible to give more than they will get, investigators 
must be mindful to direct the questions and stay focused and on track.  It helps to know 
the answers to as many questions as possible before they are asked.   Once the interview 
is over, it is then vital to conduct surveillance on financial transactions, voice intercepts, 
and review physical tracking to identify responses to contact, and changes in patterns.  
Questioning witnesses and informants may require some aggressive behavior from the 
investigator.  Investigators must be prepared to ‘dirty’em up’ if necessary to get the 
information needed to further the investigation.  This includes checking to see whether 
there is an existing warrant for the fugitive’s arrest which can lead to parole and 
probation searches and, if enough probable cause exists, then this could yield a search 
warrant which would enable the investigator to gather still more personal information.     
2. Mistakes are Made 
Both the pursuer and fugitive make mistakes.  A common error for the 
investigator is to allow a pre-conceived theory about a case to dictate the direction of the 
investigation.  Everyone has a tendency to allow cognitive biases creep into the way a 
problem is perceived instead of analyzing all the information and discounting none.  For 
instance, because everyone has been saying for years that Usama bin Laden is in the 
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, we ignore all other evidence 
suggesting anything different.  Another mistake is to allow external actors like 
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informants, media, and other law enforcement agencies to dictate the direction of the 
investigation.  Relying too much on intelligence that has been over-diluted or over-
filtered by other investigators and analysts tends to lead the pursuer down the wrong path.  
It is imperative for the lead investigator to know all the details and behaviors of the 
fugitive, and to understand who’s potentially involved in hiding and abetting the 
fugitive—who they are, and what they do in order to look for patterns and changes in 
their behavior.  The investigator should never discount or overlook the obvious.  An 
informant with the correct answer could be staring you in the face, even though he may 
not look the part, speak the language, or meet the criteria normally associated with 
knowing important things.  Individuals like this represent the ‘golden nuggets’ that can 
change the entire direction of the pursuit.   
Meanwhile, a persistent debilitating problem that exists in law enforcement at the 
federal and international levels is the lack of interagency coordination and limited sharing 
of information with investigators and enforcement personnel at the local and state levels.   
It is not always best to have a large force hunting one fugitive, but it is absolutely critical 
to have everyone aware that a fugitive is being pursued.  For instance, if everyone knows 
who is being pursued then when the fugitive tries to rob a bank in South Africa, that fact 
should be transmitted to the investigator, which will hopefully lead to the fugitive’s 
apprehension.  Fugitives become cocky and over-confident, perhaps contacting someone 
they know, sharing their secret, or just becoming too comfortable or complacent.  
Fugitives will often commit another crime or get arrested, and once they are booked and 
their information is entered into the database and the prints match, then bingo, the cavalry 
can be called.    
Being able to react immediately is essential to apprehending fugitives, because all 
too often these individuals are not prepared to move in short order, or someone may 
suddenly and unexpectedly blow their cover.  Manhunting is a very time consuming, 
database-intensive, but simple process once someone is familiar with the steps.  To do 
manhunting effectively requires dedicated individuals who are willing to sacrifice career 
progression and stick to the same job, year after year.  Investigators must be able to work 
each investigation from cradle to grave, and if information and intelligence is mishandled 
be willing to restart the process.  
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V. DECEPTION AND THE FUGITIVE 
Greek playwright Sophocles once stated, “Profit is sweet, even if it comes from 
deception” (as cited in Bartebly).  Sophocles’ statement is quite applicable to the 
fugitive’s situation since the fugitive will seek to enrich himself by using deception as 
much as possible to avoid capture.  Given this point, how does the United States military 
counter or at least minimize the effects of a fugitive’s deceptions, which he uses to stay 
hidden?  The answer to this deception challenge is not easily found.  In fact, leading 
intelligence analysts still struggle to solve conventional military deceptions that involve 
large numbers of troops, hard-to-hide platforms, and established governments.  Bearing 
this in mind, in this chapter we seek to simply orient analysts to a PONI’s possible 
deception operation in order to point out how this can complicate finding and 
apprehending such individuals. 
A. DECEPTION DEFINED 
A variety of meanings come to mind when someone mentions the word 
“deception”—ranging from extramarital affairs to poker games—but the area of interest 
for the military intelligence professional today is the use of deception by non-state actors.  
To gain a workable definition, one can start with the U.S. definition of military deception.  
U.S. Joint Publication 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception defines it as: “Those 
actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly 
military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take 
specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly 
mission” (Joint Doctrine, 1996, p I-1).   
Although this definition is a good starting point, it needs to be further expanded 
since it does not take into account non-state actors such as fugitives and their targets of 
operations.  With this in mind, a better definition would also refer to those actions 
conducted by non-state actors that not only mislead their adversary’s military decision 
makers but also any component of the adversary’s government that might be responsible 
for developing and executing policies against the non-state actors’ group.  Expanding the 
definition in this way would also capture the unique characteristics of dealing with 
transnational PONIs. 
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B. THE BASIC PARTS OF A DECEPTION OPERATION 
Having settled on a working definition of deception that can be applied to 
international fugitives, let us now review the main parts of a deception operation and 
their importance.  In our view, a fugitive’s deception operation has five main 
components: objective, deceiver, target, story, and means (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, p. 
28).  One should approach these parts in the order they are listed since the order also 
amounts to a general roadmap for how deception operations are formed and carried out.  
The objective is the end goal, while the other four components determine whether or not 
the objective will be achieved.  At the same time, it is critical to approach these 
components from the point of view that the fugitive is an international PONI.  This means 
that conventional definitions, such as those found in U.S. military publications, can serve 
as starting points, but will require further elaboration and refinement on a case by case 
basis.   
1. Objective 
U.S. Joint Publication 3-58 defines the objective of deception as, “The desired 
result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to 
do at the critical time and/or location” (Joint Doctrine, 1996, p A-1).  The key here is to 
remember that the PONI’s deception objective is designed to get the hunter to act in a 
certain way to support a greater mission objective.  In the case of al-Qaeda, the overall 
mission objective is the eradication of infidels in order to return Muslim lands to their 
true Islamic roots, as intended by Mohammed.  al-Qaeda operatives change their 
appearance, mask their activities, and camouflage their operational bases in order to 
deceive the United States and non-Muslim countries so that they can achieve their goals.  
Additionally, their deception objective sets the stage for planning and executing the rest 
of their deception operation. 
2. Deceiver 
A fugitive deceiver is someone who alters or directs the altering of information 
received by the hunter so that the hunter makes decisions that favor the fugitive.  
Specifically, the fugitive deceiver conducts actions via means which allow him to ‘tell the 
story’ to the hunter.  Ultimately, this helps him achieve his deception objective.  On the 
larger scale, deception acts as a force enhancer allowing the fugitive deceiver to gain an 
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advantage over the hunter.  Taken a step further, fugitives and their networks can deceive 
from the tactical to the strategic level.  Therefore, deceivers can be found anywhere and, 
since they are non-state actors, they are not constrained to military venues when 
conducting their deception operation (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, p 22).  This requires that 
intelligence analysts take into consideration other religious, political, economic or tribal 
figures and organizations which lie beyond the military realm that may be supporting 
non-state actors.   
3. Deceiver’s Target 
U.S. Joint Publication 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception defines the 
deception target as, “The adversary decision maker with the authority to make the 
decision that will achieve the deception objective” (Joint Doctrine, 1996, p A-1).  This 
definition, too, needs to be expanded beyond the military, to include other government 
entities such as the Departments of State and Treasury which play important roles in 
policy formulation.  Non-state actors such as al-Qaeda target individual and multiple 
government entities simultaneously to create an overall veil of deception for both 
operational and support activities.  Furthermore, analysts need to understand that 
collection assets and analytic organizations are not the targets per se, but rather are 
among the means by which the deception operations are executed against decision 
makers.   
4. Deception Story 
U.S. Joint Publication 3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception defines the 
deception story as, “A scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to 
cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception” (Joint Doctrine, 1996, p A-2).  
Specifically, the deception story is the plan which the fugitive deceiver uses to 
manipulate the hunter to his advantage.  Moreover, the story must be believable, 
verifiable, consistent, and executable.  To meet these criteria, deceivers in general, and 
fugitives in particular, will prey upon the hunter’s inherent perceptions and knowledge 
about them.  These biases will be covered in greater depth below. 
5. Means 
U.S. military doctrine defines the means of deception as, “The methods, 
resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target” 
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(Joint Doctrine, 1996, p A-2).   These methods can be viewed using two different lenses: 
form and function.  In terms of form, means can be separated into physical, technical, and 
administrative categories.  In the fugitive’s case, the same person or an ambiguous group 
of loosely connected people can orchestrate the means.  Resources ranging from media 
outlets and websites to religious institutions and non-governmental agencies can serve as 
conduits to transmit the fugitive’s deception story.   
The functional lens is a better way to describe the means of deception used by 
fugitive PONIs.  In The Art of Darkness, Gerwehr and Glenn offer seven categories of 
functional deception, to include: camouflage and concealment, demonstration, decoy, 
mimicry, dazzling, disinformation, and conditioning (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000, p. 28).  
These terms were originally applied to means of deception used in urban warfare; 
however, they can be modified to serve as a starting point for discussing PONIs’ means 
of deception.   
Camouflage and concealment refers to how a fugitive attempts to disappear using 
different types of objects.  In the case of camouflage, the fugitive uses natural or man-
made materials to blend into his surroundings.  If evading in the forest, an individual may 
darken his face with mud or cover his body with pine boughs to blend in.  These actions 
would correspond to the traditional sense of camouflage.  Another approach to 
camouflage involves assuming the appearance of the local people.  For instance, the 
PONI could camouflage himself by dressing as a Bedouin if he was in the Saudi desert or 
he could attempt to blend in at Singapore’s international port by appearing as a 
longshoreman. 
The idea of concealment involves the use of terrain to hide from observation 
(Gerwehr et al., 2000, p. 30).  The fugitive could use traditional concepts of concealment, 
which involve physical terrain, and could thus hide in caves, mountains, or swamps.  
However, PONI concealment should also be expanded to include the social terrain.  
Areas and groups that contain similar political, ethnic, religious, or occupational activities 
could be used to shield the fugitive.  For instance, the fugitive could hide in a 
neighborhood full of co-ethnics.  Additionally, he could take cover by using religious 
institutions or non-governmental agencies to prevent hunters from seeing him.  
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The second means of fugitive deception involves demonstrations.  This concept 
centers on activities designed to draw the attention of the hunter away from areas that are 
important to the fugitive. Specifically, demonstrations could come in the form of an 
attack in a neighboring province within the same country or announcement of the 
formation of a new terrorist organization in a nearby state.  The aim would be to cause 
the hunter to shift focus at least temporarily to the new event, thereby costing him 
precious time and providing the fugitive greater liberty.  
The third means of deception involves decoys or dummies.  According to 
Gerwehr and Glenn, decoying is, “The placement of a natural or artificial construct away 
from a deceiver to portray an entity or object of significance to the target” (Gerwehr et 
al., 2000, p. 30).  How would decoying work in the case of PONIs?  State leaders, for 
instance, routinely use body doubles or ringers.  False trails can be created through the 
use of imposters.  Decoys can also engage in scripted cell phone or email conservations 
designed to give the hunter the impression that the PONI is in one place when he really is 
not.  The fugitive’s network might also create a mock hide-out.  A ‘safe house’ with fresh 
food, new clothes, and recent newspapers which fit the fugitive’s profile would be 
established so that when the hunter gains access to it, he thinks that the fugitive is nearby.   
The fourth means of functional deception involves mimicry: the fugitive uses an 
existing entity or creates one which is of significant interest to the hunter.  For example, 
the traditional military application of mimicry involves the use of heat and noise 
generators to create the illusion that a large formation of tanks is approaching.  This gains 
the hunter’s attention, and he either avoids the tanks or requests additional resources to 
investigate and/or attack them.  A PONI could create an image that implies he is more 
powerful than originally thought.  He could create the impression that he has the full 
support of a country’s government, or that the entire population backs him, and thus any 
attempt to capture him may not be worth the resources spent or the political backlash.  On 
the other hand, the fugitive could make himself appear to be a much smaller target than 
he is.  He could do this by portraying himself as being low on the totem pole or 
possessing a “clean” record in comparison to other members of his network or group.  
The hunter may then be led to believe that the fugitive isn’t worth pursuing, especially 
when other, higher profile PONIs remain at large.   
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The fifth means of deception involves dazzling or sensory saturation: the hunter is 
so overwhelmed by so much “noise” that the PONI becomes lost in the clutter (Gerwehr 
et al., 2000, p. 31).  The PONI, for instance, could create and release multiple false 
sightings and reports of sightings, and thus overwhelm the hunter’s ability to track 
everything at once.  This could be done in a couple of ways.  First, the fugitive could 
create multiple, viable indicators that indicate he is located on several different continents 
simultaneously.  Another approach could center on ensuring that multiple leads of 
equivalent importance coming from a wide variety of reliable sources all appear at once.  
Some might involve the fugitive himself while others might represent new and higher 
priority targets.  This would put the hunter in the position of trying to decide what is most 
important while precious resources are consumed validating the intelligence reports.    
The sixth means of deception involves disinformation.  As in the case of 
conventional state-on-state deception, the fugitive has multiple ways to convey altered 
information about himself via the media.  Newspapers, televisions news reports, and 
radio broadcasts, as well as websites, emails, and web-logs could be used to shape the 
hunter’s response.  Reports and updates concerning the fugitive’s current location, health, 
or popular support could affect the hunter’s strategy.  Again, this would force the hunter 
to vet his sources, consuming valuable resources in the process. 
The seventh means of deception centers on the act of conditioning.  Gerwher and 
Glenn point out that conditioning involves “generating and then exploiting a bias, belief, 
or habit” (Gerwehr et al., 2000, p. 31).  How does a PONI manage this?  If, for instance, 
the hunter relies on sophisticated technology and large organizations to conduct 
surveillance and track the PONI’s movements, the PONI can conduct routine activities 
that are easily collected against.  Over time, the surveillance operators will become 
accustomed to “seeing” the PONI, but they will not realize that the PONI is actually 
exploiting their technological biases.  Thus, the hunter will feel comfortable with the 
intelligence he is gathering even though the PONI is actually conducting operations 
elsewhere.  This is yet another reason the hunter will need to be self-reflective, so as to 
carefully determine which of his biases and habits are readily available for exploitation 




Orientation requires that the hunter understand the enemy and himself in order to 
begin to identify and possibly overcome the PONI’s deception.  The hunter must not only 
try to understand as much as possible about the PONI, but also how that PONI sees the 
organization that is hunting him.  This is where framing the problem is essential since this 
will establish boundaries that guide the hunter’s efforts.  This also is directly in line with 
Paul Rosa’s reasoning that, “Among the most useful types of characterizations of data is 
information pertaining to the potential perpetrator of a D&D operation.  The motives, 
proclivities, objectives, knowledge (including feedback mechanisms), and D&D tools, for 
example, of a potential D&D perpetrator may be consistent or inconsistent with 
manipulation of a specific item of information or source” (Rosa, 2002).  In other words, 
only with a good understanding of the particular fugitive can the analyst or hunter focus 
his time and resources effectively.   
1. Nature of the PONI and His Organization 
Analysts and hunters should identify the type of PONI they are hunting by asking 
a variety of questions.  For instance, is the PONI acting as an individual or is he a 
member of a group?  If he belongs to a group, is this group sponsored by a state or a non-
state entity?  Additionally, what best describes the nature of the group: is it local, 
national, or transnational in scope?  Each one of these questions will enable hunters and 
analysts to better appreciate the type of PONI they are pursuing.  They can then explore 
past cases for information about how similar PONIs conducted deception operations, and 
the strengths and weaknesses of those efforts.   
2. PONI’s Denial and Deception Resources  
Hunters and analysts must obtain as much knowledge as possible concerning the 
resources a PONI has at his disposal for creating and conducting denial and deception 
operations since these means will directly influence the complexity of his operations. By 
being aware of the level of complexity a PONI may achieve, the hunter can better 
allocate his collection resources.  Attention should be focused on several areas, to 




When looking at these sectors, each should be considered independently, and then in 
concert since how these capabilities are combined can create new synergies for the 
fugitive.     
3. PONI’s Denial and Deception History 
By analyzing a PONI’s historical uses of deception, hunters and analysts can 
recognize and explore possible patterns.  These patterns should suggest to the hunter 
possible areas to be exploited to help reveal the PONI’s position.  Specifically, if the 
PONI relied on certain resources such as key personnel or large amounts of money to 
conduct previous deceptions, then these factors can serve as starting points for collection.  
Remembering that all denial and deception activities are unnatural in nature, there should 
always be some residual evidence that can be examined.  Specifically, the analyst should 
focus on support details, strategies, and cross-cultural knowledge the PONI may have 
used to advantage in the past.  If the operation failed, the analyst should pay particular 
attention to the failure points and the conditions that created them.  If a PONI has no 
history of deception activities, his background and motives can be compared to known 
deception cases to see how PONIs in similar situations, hailing from similar backgrounds, 
behaved, and thus suggesting clues.   
4. PONI’s Culture 
The PONI’s culture plays an important role since it will influence how he 
interacts with his hunter.  Certain cultures may increase or reduce the constraints faced by 
the PONI and how those constraints can be handled.  Analysts must be aware of the 
cultural factor as they develop the portrait of the PONI.  In The Mind’s Eye, Daniel 
Druckman and Robert Bjork highlight this by pointing out that, ”By properly refining and 
adapting their methods, information can be gathered on how individuals from various 
cultures and subcultures conceive of deception and lying.  In turn, this information might 
lead to determining what sorts of stories or actions constitute socially unacceptable 
behaviors.” (1991)   
Furthermore, the concept of culture should not be limited to just racial, religious, 
or social groupings; rather, it should be expanded to include corporate, governmental, and 
familial groups as well.  Questions concerning who the PONI works for, what family he 
comes from, where he grew up, and the nature of his government should be raised.  Then, 
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the answers to these questions should be examined in the context of how these external 
players view denial and deception.  Also, by better understanding the PONI’s 
background, analysts should have greater insight into the PONI’s likely intent.  
Specifically, the analyst should explore the concept of whether or not, to what extent, and 
in what areas denial and deception aligns with the PONI’s cultural morals, mores, and 
values.  Finally, it should be noted that although culture is an important factor, it should 
not become the only factor considered when constructing the background of the PONI.    
5. PONI’s Knowledge of His Deception Target 
Another key area that must be examined involves how the PONI and his fellow-
deceivers view the hunter.  Hunters and analysts must look at themselves as much as they 
look at the PONI.  This is critical since the enemy has a choice to make about how he 
conducts his denial and deception operations.  In particular, he can control the 
observables the hunter sees or he can control the hunter’s focus.  Since the PONI has a 
limited amount of resources he can devote to fooling the target, it is to his advantage to 
control the hunter’s focus rather than to control all of the observables.  In the end, the 
PONI will most likely use a mix of the two strategies.  Thus, the best way to reduce the 
success rate of a PONI’s denial and deception operation is for the hunter to understand 
his own biases, intelligence system, and decision-making process, and how the PONI is 
likely to try to manipulate these to his advantage. 
a. Biases 
Self-induced biases cloud people’s judgment by preventing them from 
viewing an adversary’s intentions and actions for what they are rather than what they 
expect them to be.  In some cases, the hunter wants to see the fugitive as a lesser person 
or coward who lacks the skill and ability to deceive.  Such a perspective automatically 
creates the false impression that the enemy is not worthy or capable of executing 
sophisticated operations in general, and deception in particular.  Ephraim Kam, the author 
of Surprise Attack, drives home this point by stating, “…The belief in military superiority 
has an especially distorting effect when it relies on the concept that the other side has 
deep-rooted, permanent deficiencies” (1988, p. 80).  When the analyst believes 
something similar, he opens himself to deception operations by his adversary.   
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At the same time, one’s values can induce a form of self-bias.  Each 
culture is distinct in the way its members view the world and in what they place value.  
Certain principles are accepted at face value while others are considered to be mutable 
rather than hard and fast rules.  For instance, Americans tend to take the word of others at 
face value whereas elsewhere (e.g. in Arab societies) what is said is not necessarily what 
is meant, and everyone realizes this.  Additionally, things like pride, greed, fear, or 
curiosity can be exploited by the PONI to create a sense of comfort for the hunter, 
particularly when these are known to be things that motivate the hunter.  The more the 
PONI knows about the hunter and the less the hunter recognizes about him, the more the 
PONI can take advantage of cross-cultural differences to further his deception.   
Cognitive biases create problems for intelligence analysts by hampering 
their ability to accurately comprehend incoming information. What are these biases 
exactly?  According to Heuer, cognitive biases are: 
Mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies.  
It is important to distinguish cognitive biases from other forms of bias, 
such as cultural bias, organizational bias, or bias that results from one's 
own self-interest.  In other words, a cognitive bias does not result from 
any emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but 
rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing information.  
A cognitive bias is a mental error that is consistent and predictable (Heuer, 
1999, Chp 9).   
There are a variety of contributing factors that feed cognitive biases, such 
as relying on word of mouth over statistical data or willingness to believe discredited 
evidence.  These impact experts and novices alike and are not limited by one’s profession 
or experience level (Heuer, 1999).  Given this reality, a PONI engaged in deception will 
look to take advantage of these weaknesses, and thus will try to create an image that the 
hunter’s mind by itself cannot distinguish from reality.  While this bias is difficult to 
overcome, even when recognized by the hunter, the first step in minimizing its effects is 
to recognize that it exists.   
b. Intelligence and the Decision Making Process 
Another area that needs addressing involves how the targets of denial and 
deception acquire and then make decisions based upon the information they receive.  
Hunters and analysts should develop a working knowledge of the systems and procedures 
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used to collect intelligence against the PONI and his associated organization.  Efforts 
should focus on the collection patterns of platforms, ranging from spies in the field to 
orbiting satellites.  Special care should be taken not to forget open sources such as foreign 
newspapers, diplomats, and television reports.  These sources of information are of 
particular importance since they provide the PONI with means for conveying the 
deception story and monitoring the hunter’s reactions.  Roy Godson and James Wirtz 
drive home this point when they say, “Deception requires information channels to reach 
the adversary…  Deception planners require the authority and imagination to exploit 
traditional channels and develop new ones on an adhoc basis.” (Godson and Wirtz, 2002)   
Not only does the PONI engaging in deception look for ways to inject and 
receive information, he is also interested in how analysis and decision-making is 
conducted by his hunter.  Specifically, he wants to understand how the hunter assesses 
received information and then how the hunter decides to act.  Hunters should consider 
how their organization collects, validates, sorts, analyzes, and then presents information 
to the action arm of the government.  Based upon this information, hunters should ask 
how and at what level decisions are made,, and how these decisions become publicly 
known.  
c. PONI’s Strategies for Denial and Deception 
Hunters should examine the possible denial and deception strategies that a 
PONI can pursue to keep himself hidden.  Strategies result from the interaction of factors, 
such as the PONI’s nature, culture, resources, activities, and history, with the capabilities 
and nature of the deception target.  Although there are a variety of ways to categorize a 
PONI’s deception strategies, our approach is based on the deception sophistication levels 
described by Gerwehr and Glenn in Unweaving the Web.  These levels are: static, 
dynamic, adaptive, and premeditative (Gerwehr and Glenn, 2002, pp. 33-34).   
A static strategy would be the simplest deception scheme: a PONI’s 
operations would remain the same even though other factors, such as the hunters, 
resources, or outside stimuli have changed.  With a dynamic strategy, one would expect 
to see a deception plan that would be triggered only under certain conditions.  Although a 
trigger would be required, the actual activities once initiated would always remain the 
same.  An adaptive strategy would build on the dynamic strategy by accounting for 
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changes in both the stimuli and the activities carried out in response to them.  Finally, the 
premeditative approach is the most advanced since it would take into account multiple 
factors ranging from the hunter’s nature and capabilities to the PONI’s own history and 
capabilities.  This strategy would be aimed specifically at one particular hunter.   
By examining the strategies available to PONIs, one can begin to define 
the time and space restrictions on his deception operations.  In turn, identifying 
parameters should help the analyst to restrict the amount of information that he will have 
to review.   
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VI. A MANHUNTING METHOD 
Understanding the fugitive’s strategy to avoid capture creates the foundation for 
understanding his decision-making process.  The fugitive’s decisions are based on four 
apprehension avoidance criteria: familiarity, survivability, safety, and vulnerability.  
When the fugitive asks, “Where do I go to hide?” these four criteria help to frame his 
choices.  Familiarity, the first criterion, refers to the level of comfort or intimacy a 
fugitive feels when he is in a particular geographical area.  This familiarity can be based 
on prior visits to a location, close associates who live in an area, or a shared ethno-
linguistic identity.  The premise here is that every individual has a cognitive bias toward 
“comfort zones.”  For instance, a person who has spent his entire life in an urban area 
may find it difficult to live in a jungle because he has not developed the necessary skills 
to operate effectively in that environment.  This cognitive bias may or may not be 
cultural; a cultural bias is one by which an individual interprets information according to 
his cultural orientation. 
We believe fugitives may well suffer from what we call “location familiarity 
effect.”  Location familiarity effect is similar in concept to another popular cognitive 
bias, mere exposure effect.  “Mere exposure effect is a psychological artifact well known 
to advertisers: people express undue liking for things merely because they are familiar 
with them” (wikipedia, 2005).  Therefore, location familiarity effect would predict that 
fugitives will prefer to hide in locations with which they are familiar.  When a PONI 
makes a decision about where to go, his decision is limited by his experiences, to include 
the sum of the locations he has visited.   
Yet, how does a PONI know whether he will be safe or have the necessary life 
support to survive?  Again, the location familiarity effect likely plays an important role.  
Generally speaking, the fugitive should choose locations where he already knows or feels 
he can survive and be safe.  When a fugitive goes to a location where he has limited to no 
knowledge, then his level of uncertainty is bound to be high.  As the fugitive’s level of 
uncertainty increases so, too, does the level of risk that he must be willing to accept.  If 
he goes to a location about which he has limited knowledge, his level of uncertainty is 
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higher, and hence his level of risk will also be higher.  Although different individuals 
have varying degrees of risk tolerance, a fugitive should always try to minimize his 
uncertainty ergo the location familiarity effect.   
Essentially, a PONI’s mental map constrains his potential hiding locations.  These 
constraints or cognitive biases are greatly influenced by the number and varying types of 
places he has previously visited.  On rare occasions, certain fugitives are able to 
disassociate themselves from their previous life.  However, this takes a tremendous 
psychological toll on the fugitive.  Few fugitives are able to break all contacts from their 
previous life because of the immense psychological strain.  For example, when Eric 
Rudolph was finally apprehended after five years on the run, Rudolph was very 
cooperative with local law enforcement—not something you would expect from such a 
notorious fugitive.  According to Kathleen Walls, the author of Man Hunt: The Eric 
Rudolph Story, “The jail administrator, Joe Morris, was surprised at the prisoner’s good 
manners” (Walls, 2003, p 77).  A possible reason why Rudolph was so well behaved 
could have to do with his psychological state and the impact severing his social ties had; 
this may well have weakened his resolve.  It is important to note that severing social ties 
is difficult for most fugitives.  Even if only limited, most fugitives tend to maintain some 
type of contact with members of their social network.  So long as fugitives are unwilling 
to depart from their previous relationships and normative behaviors their cognitive biases 
will help delimit their decisions.   
In addition, a fugitive’s decisions are also restricted by a survivability criterion.  
Survivability is the ability of a fugitive to operate and live in a certain geographical 
space.  For instance, a fugitive must have food, water, medical supplies, and shelter to 
survive.  Without these basic necessities, a fugitive will be forced to move to another 
location to fulfill these basic survival requirements.  However, survivability expands past 
simple life support when we consider fugitives who belong to organizations—members 
of terrorist groups, drug cartels, gangs, and mafias who attempt to avoid capture and 
prosecution while maintaining a link to the organization.  Organizational fugitives 
require, and can acquire, other types of support.  For instance, organizational fugitives 
need a means to communicate and coordinate activities, transportation to conduct 
business, personnel and equipment to support operations, and a financial infrastructure 
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for requisitions.  In other words, both Type-A and Type-B PONIs tend to access support 
networks to receive different types and degrees of support.  Consequently, Type A and B 
PONIs will not choose locations where they cannot live and operate.   
Support networks not only provide physical goods, but can also provide early 
warning and physical security.  Security is another term used to describe safety, which is 
the condition of being free from danger or risk.  For the fugitive, safety includes the 
degree or likelihood of apprehension avoidance.  What helps to mitigate high levels of 
risk is the support of a trusted network that provides the PONI with protection.  The trust 
network is comprised of individuals who reside inside the individual’s larger support 
network.  A trust network is composed of those individuals who have intimate knowledge 
of the PONI’s exact location and provide him with the necessary safety to avoid being 
captured.  Generally speaking, a fugitive is more likely to trust an individual with whom 
he has long-standing ties, which have been tested in moments of danger, and/or ties with 
a considerable moral component.  If the fugitive’s trust network is neutralized then the 
fugitive’s ability to evade decreases significantly.  For instance, as Saddam Hussein’s 
trusted associates were apprehended, Saddam’s trust network began to dissolve, which 
forced Saddam to rent protection (Moore, 2004, pp 237-257).  By identifying a PONI’s 
trust network the investigator or intelligence analyst can potentially correlate individuals 
to locations, which can potentially reveal the fugitive’s hiding location. 
The final criterion is vulnerability.  Vulnerability is slightly different from safety 
in that safety is a condition provided by a trust network, whereas vulnerability is more a 
measure of the hunter’s access—a subject discussed in a previous chapter.  Some 
fugitives gravitate toward areas where they don’t feel vulnerable to capture.  They may 
not have a robust support or trust network, but the lack of accessibility by the hunter 
ensures their freedom.  Vulnerability, basically, is dictated by where the hunter operates.  
Certain legal and political constraints limit the physical space where the hunter can look 
for the fugitive.  These constraints limit the time, location, and manner of a search.  
Furthermore, vulnerability can be geographically represented on a map.  While 
vulnerability may seem easy for a hunter to map because the hunter has perfect 
knowledge of where and how he operates, the hunter must try to map the fugitive’s 
assumptions about the hunter’s locations and methods.  That is, the hunter must make 
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estimations based on the level of information he believes the fugitive has on his (the 
hunter’s) capabilities and accessibility. 
A. A MANHUNTING PROCESS 
The four criteria mentioned above are the product of a five step manhunting 
process, which is represented in the input-output model in Figure 6 below.  The five steps 
of the manhunting process are: 1) conduct an initial background investigation via 
research; 2) build a social profile; 3) identify the support network; 4) analyze the hunter’s 
constraints and limitations; 5) and conduct analysis of competing hypotheses.  This 
manhunting process is iterative and structures the problem so as to remove certain biases 
from the search operation.  This analytical process provides better resolution as to the 
fugitive’s possible locations by limiting pre-established beliefs about the fugitive’s 
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Figure 6.   A Manhunting Process 
Step One, the initial background investigation, enables the analyst or investigator 
to identify facts and assumptions about the fugitive.  During the initial investigation, the 
analyst develops a historical time-line listing dates and locations where the fugitive has 
been.  During this step, the analyst also builds an initial social network to include a 
family tree of the fugitive, and a list of classmates.  Certain assumptions can be made 
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about the fugitive, but these assumptions will need to be verified.  Step One concludes 
with developing an information request list to solicit information missing from the initial 
investigation.   
Step Two then develops the fugitive’s identity by asking the question:  who is he?  
What are his ‘communities of interest’ and ‘communities of locality’?  ‘Communities of 
interest’ include affiliations based on hobbies, skills, and interests, while ‘communities of 
locality’ define the fugitive according to where he is from or where he has lived.  These 
communities can be represented on a map as a social profile distribution overlay.  
Mapping these communities can also suggest other areas to search for more information 
about a fugitive’s potential social network(s). 
Identifying the support network is the third step in the manhunting process.  Step 
Three considers the different types of PONIs—e.g. Type-A (individual), Type-B 
(organizational), or Type-C (deposed state leaders).  Each PONI type will require 
different forms of support to survive, conduct operations, and avoid capture.  After 
identifying the various support requirements, the analyst can identify specific individuals 
from the fugitive’s social network who are likely to fulfill the fugitive’s support 
requirements.  
The fourth step in the process requires the hunter to analyze his own capabilities 
and leads to the development of an accessibility overlay and detection index.  The 
accessibility overlay graphically represents the hunter’s area of operations, and the 
detection index identifies what the hunter can observe.  The detection index examines 
different types of intelligence collection platforms and identifies what the hunter can or 
cannot detect with those collection assets.  This analysis provides a better framework for 
understanding how a fugitive could operate in a given region without being detected.  By 
analyzing both the accessibility and the hunter‘s ability to detect fugitive-related 
activities, the analyst can determine where the fugitive is most vulnerable to capture and, 
conversely, the PONI’s optimal hiding location.   
The final step is to take the objective analysis and apply a subjective set of 
metrics to identify the most likely areas where the fugitive will hide.  By using a 
technique called the ‘analysis of competing hypotheses’, described in Richard Heuer’s 
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book, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999), the intelligence analyst can greatly 
reduce certain cognitive biases that he may have when trying to determine the fugitive’s 
potential hiding location.  Once given a list of these locations, the commander can then 
direct assets to search for the PONI and collect critical information.  Once the 
information collection is complete, we have cycled through the first iteration of the five-
step process.  If the individual is located then the necessary apprehension operation can 
be initiated.  If not, additional iterations should be conducted until the individual is found.     
However, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge two fundamental 
problems associated with this five-step process.  First, this manhunting process has never 
been validated against a case study or real world scenario.  Unfortunately, limited 
academic research currently exists, and any information that is available only draws from 
bounty hunting and skip tracing.  Most of the pertinent details behind successful and 
unsuccessful U.S. government efforts remain classified.  Due to the lack of information 
available on the subject, validating this process may prove difficult until it has actually 
been tested in the field.       
Second, there is no standardized metric to measure or compare processes.  The 
current manhunting metric compares numbers of apprehensions to numbers of 
outstanding warrants.  The USG’s success rate in finding and apprehending fugitives is 
sporadic, to say the least.  For every fugitive who has been arrested, there is an example 
of an individual who has avoided capture—Usama bin Laden’s elusiveness is a case in 
point.  Since no formalized manhunting process exits in the U.S. military, the process we 





VII. NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY 
For the last 10 years, the U.S. intelligence agencies have conducted covert 
operations to capture Usama bin Laden (UBL).  Intelligence analysts carefully review 
incoming intelligence messages for clues that could reveal the location of the world’s 
most infamous fugitive.  These analysts conduct detailed Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
based on available classified information and closely analyze messages to determine who 
is talking to whom, the time of the conversation, and what is discussed.  This information 
is used to gain additional insights into the al-Qaeda terrorist network’s structure.  The 
hope is that analysis of known or suspected terrorist links will reveal an informal 
hierarchy, enabling the targeting of key personnel in the network, which could disrupt 
current and future al-Qaeda operations.  Unfortunately, this approach has not led to 
Usama bin Laden’s capture. 
With that in mind, this chapter will first examine the intelligence community’s 
current framework and identify any shortcomings in the intelligence analysts’ 
methodology.  Second, taking into account the reality of incomplete information, this 
chapter will attempt to improve on current methods by presenting an alternative 
methodology, which integrates a model and an investigative process for mapping a 
fugitive’s network.  We call this Nexus Topography (NT).  Finally, this chapter will 
describe the benefits Nexus Topography offers the intelligence community when hunting 
fugitives. 
A. CURRENT FRAMEWORK 
The first step in understanding why a new methodology is needed involves an 
understanding of how the US counter-terrorism community currently maps fugitive 
networks and the problems with that method.  Since the September 11th attacks, the US 
intelligence counter-terrorism community has shown a great deal of interest in the 
applications of Social Network Analysis for tracking and targeting terrorists.  Managers 
within the intelligence community have aggressively sought out experts and developed 
software tools to conduct Social Network Analysis, while at the same time instructing 
their subordinates to build large databases of information to analyze. 
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Since the effort to capture terrorists became such an urgent task post-9/11, it 
appears that either the general concept of how to build the framework was not sufficiently 
developed or the concept was not communicated to those analysts at the lower levels who 
are responsible for doing the actual work.  Regardless, this approach has created a de 
facto system for reconstructing a terrorist’s network based on the supposition of 
conventional, hierarchically structured force designed to fight in post-World War II 
Europe.  That is, this approach creates an organizational chart based on a pre-determined 
template.  Given this outdated approach, analysts construct and implement message 
filters that seek out specific information from intelligence messages to create a picture of 
the enemy and his organization.  This system usually involves taking incoming classified 
message traffic and filtering out clues as to which individuals are subordinate to whom 
and how the organization interacts operationally.   
B. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY SHORTCOMINGS 
Although intelligence analysts are attempting to capture all the information about 
a fugitive, they are coming up short for four reasons.  First, the system used by 
intelligence analysts is rooted in a cold war mentality, which lacks the flexibility for 
dealing with the current asymmetric and dynamic nature of terrorists (Fellman & Wright, 
p. 5).  Terrorists generally operate in cellular networks, which are more likely to be flat 
horizontal rather then vertical organizations (Baraba`si, 2003, p. 223).  Horizontal 
structures negate the value of looking for specific chains of command, which are either 
not present or ambiguous in nature.  Also, horizontal structures grant the fugitive a 
greater degree of flexibility in interacting with other collaborators.  Specifically, the 
fugitive will interact with those individuals who can help him with a particular problem.  
Therefore, the fugitive’s decisions are contextually based upon his needs at a given time, 
place, and under circumstances which prevent him from following traditional hierarchal 
patterns like those used by standard military commands.  Since these patterns are 
irregular, they are not likely to be captured by a hierarchical construct. 
Second, analysts often ignore open source information.  The bias towards 
classified information likely stems from the days when the little information known about 
the Soviet Union was collected through official government assets.  As a result, analysts 
depended on classified intelligence collection assets to fulfill almost all information 
65 
requirements.  However, analysts can now access a great deal of information about 
PONIs from on-line sources such as websites, blogs, and chat rooms.  Furthermore, 
journalists can provide useful information because journalists have greater access to a 
broad rand of different individuals, groups, and organizations, man of whom use the 
media to spread propaganda.  Unfortunately, most analysts continue to ignore open 
sources for information on fugitives.   
Third, the current fugitive framework only concentrates on the operational 
network and does not capture the fugitive’s entire social network, built over the course of 
his lifetime.  In particular, the system considers those elements critical to the fugitive’s 
operational involvement within the organization.  Given this situation, a large amount of 
information is typically missing on the fugitive’s religious, educational, political, 
military, criminal, and economic associations.  In Dark Networks: The Structure, 
Operation, and Performance of International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking 
Networks, Brinton Milward and Joerg Raab highlight this point for al-Qaeda, stating 
“Unlike the drug smuggling networks, the membership of al-Qaeda seems to be quite 
diverse in terms of ethnic, national, and social background.  Operatives are from a variety 
of countries, born Muslims and converts, highly educated men from middle class or 
upper class families to petty criminals with only limited education” (Milward & Raab, p. 
10).  Given these wide-ranging differences, the current system fails to capture the 
complex nature of these relationships. 
Additionally, the current framework primarily concentrates on operational ties 
between fugitives and fails to provide any historical context for these relationships. In 
Uncloaking Terrorist Networks, Valdis Krebs, drives home the importance of earlier 
relationships stating, “Conspirators don't form many ties outside of their immediate 
cluster and often minimize the activation of existing ties inside the network.  Strong ties 
between prior contacts, which were frequently formed years ago in school and training 
camps, keep the cells linked. Yet, unlike normal social networks, these strong ties remain 
mostly dormant and therefore hidden to outsiders” (Krebs, 2002).  Therefore, analysts 
have no way of knowing if the fugitive has developed strong relationships through his 
past activities since these bonds do not appear in recent intelligence reports.  As 
mentioned before, the horizontal structure of terrorist networks allows fugitives to 
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activate latent relationships, which baffles intelligence analysts and prevents collection 
assets from identifying additional associates.   
Fourth, Social Network Analysis (SNA) suffers from an inherent flaw due to a 
reliance on complete information.  Specifically, traditional SNA relies on an a priori 
knowledge of relationships, but without complete information Social Network Analysis is 
limited in its effectiveness.  Additionally, most fugitives who are members of 
transnational criminal groups—like terrorist organizations, drug traffickers, and illegal 
arms dealers—operate in an opaque environment.  Their clandestine network’s cellular 
structure is developed to prevent information from being gathered on the organization.  
As a result, any type of useful analysis must be conducted with incomplete information.  
Consequently, intelligence analysts need a map to identify areas of missing 
information, which will enable US intelligence analysts to construct a more complete 
picture of the fugitive’s support network.  The key to developing such a map requires an 
integrated framework, process, and methodology specifically designed to identify missing 
information, something we label Nexus Topography.     
C. NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY 
While Social Network Analysis documents the connections or links in a social 
group, Nexus Topography describes the universe of potential relationships in different 
social environments and cultures.  The word “nexus” comes from the Latin word 
“nectere,” which means to bind.  So, Nexus Topography maps social forums or 
environments that bind people together.  The advantage of Nexus Topography is that it 
facilitates identification of missing information, which further allows intelligence analysts 
to redirect collection assets.           
In developing a picture of a PONI’s clandestine social network one must move 
from the known to the unknown.  In the development of a social network there are two 
constants: all social interactions occur at a specified place and at a specified time.  If two 
individuals never occupy the same time and space, they are not likely to develop a direct 
link. Conversely, the likelihood of an interaction occurring increases if two individuals do 
occupy the same time and space, referred to from here on as spatial coincidence.  The 
exception to spatial coincidence involves the ability to create virtual relationships over 
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the Internet in places such as chat rooms (something beyond the scope of this thesis).  
Therefore, the primary focus of NT is to show when, where, why, and how relationships 
are formed.  NT’s aim is to understand the intricacies of relationship development to 
forecast the PONI’s complete social network.   
1. Relationship Development 
A short discussion about where relationships are developed is necessary before 
we can fully flush out Nexus Topography.  The initial social environment where 
relationships are formed is in the family unit.  The first bonds are those formed between 
parents and children, brothers and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren, cousins, and 
aunts and uncles.  These family ties are often considered the strongest social bonds 
developed between people.  In many cultures, generations of family members live 
together in the same household and maintain close ties.  The next most common set of 
social interactions occurs between teachers, students, and classmates.  These bonds can 
last for generations, but the social interaction itself occurs at specific schools and 
universities.  Upon completion of academic study, most people transition straight into the 
market place, which is another common location where social interactions occur.  Yet, 
another area where social interactions take place includes religion (i.e. churches, 
mosques, and temples).  For instance, religious congregations normally have a set time 
and location where members meet to worship. 
The social interactions mentioned above all occur within what we earlier referred 
to as communities of identity.  There are two types of communities of identity important 
to the development of relationships: communities of locality and communities of interest.  
The community of locality is the district or geographic region in which people live, 
interact, or under which they are governed.  An example of a community of locality is a 
neighborhood, village, city, town or province.  Communities of interest, on the other 
hand, are communities formed around a common interest or shared experience.  For 
example, prisoners or inmates, members of the military, scientists, sports enthusiasts, and 
hobbyists comprise of communities of interest.  The underlying assertion is that 
relationships are always developed within communities, whether these are communities 
of locality or communities of interest.  By examining a fugitive’s communities of locality 
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and interest, an analyst can create the PONI’s social profile.  This profile can aide in 
mapping the PONI’s affiliation network. 
2. Diverse, Redundant, and Adaptive Relationships 
At this time, it is important to introduce the concepts of diversity, redundancy, 
and adaptability.  Diversity of identity refers to the fact that individuals often have 
multiple identities: a familial identity, an employment identity, a religious identity, and 
an academic identity.  Each identity is different and helps define the individual’s social 
network(s).  Redundancy refers to individuals sharing multiple identities across networks.  
For instance, two individuals could attend the same church, graduate from the same 
university, and work in the same office building.  In this case, these two individuals have 
a redundant relationship based upon multiple shared identities (location, religion, 
education, and employment).  The byproduct of redundancy is that some links between 
sets of individuals may be disproportionately strong.  Finally, relationships have the 
characteristic of changing over time.  That is, a fugitive’s social network may alter as the 
fugitive’s interests change, he moves to another community, or his position within that 
community shifts.  These changes directly influence the nature of his relationships, which 
will further affect his informal network.  Diversity, redundancy, and adaptability are what 
make informal social networks, and especially clandestine terrorist networks, so 
powerful, and why military commanders have a hard time disabling these networks.   
D. AFFILIATION NETWORKS AND LONGITUDINALANALYSIS 
After reviewing the concepts of redundancy, diversity, and adaptability, it is now 
time to discuss affiliation networks and time analysis.  In Social Network Analysis: 
Methods and Applications, Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust describe affiliation 
networks as “two-mode networks, consisting of a set of actors and a set of events” (1994, 
pp 291-298).  Affiliation networks illustrate or map ties developed at events or activities.  
Such events could include sporting events, clubs, or religious meetings.  These events 
may serve as a catalyst to unite two or more individuals into a group or clique.  
Unfortunately, affiliation networks are currently modeled according to traditional node 
and link diagrams.  That is, the event serves as the central node and each individual is 
linked together through attendance at such an event.  This type of static analysis has very 
limited uses in the analysis of clandestine networks.   
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One of the major problems with traditional network analysis is measuring and 
depicting time or longitudinal data.  Unfortunately, most longitudinal analysis 
concentrates on how networks change and adapt over time, but rarely focuses on how 
networks are created.  This type of analysis is also depicted in only two dimensions.  As 
Wasserman and Faust state, “network analysis and network models have often been 
criticized for being static.  Although much work has been done on longitudinal models, 
applications of this methodology are sorely lacking” (1994, p 730).  However, time—and 
the timing of relationships—is extremely important in unraveling small world terrorist 
networks.   
More useful is strand analysis.  Traditional SNA graphically depicts nodes and 
links, but strands represent the life span of individuals.  Strands are linked together by 
ties formed through various affiliations.  Strand analysis is three dimensional analysis 
with individuals, time, and events each representing a different dimension in 3-D space.    
The advantage to strand analysis is that it depicts where potential social links can 
develop. Using both strand analysis and the NT template can effectively build a picture of 
the PONI’s potential associates that were previously unobservable. 
E. MAPPING THE NEXUS  
Relationships develop inside specific regions or communities based on the 
concepts of identity and locality.  These specific regions can be categorized and used to 
template a range of bonds, which should help analysts investigate key areas of possible 
interaction.  These regions of nexus are religious, political, educational, criminal, 
military, familial, cultural, and economic.  It is important to note that many of these 
overlap.  For instance, Islamic fundamentalist groups use religion as a source of political 
power, economic exchange, and cultural identity.    
1. Familial 
To determine familial relationships, the analyst must identify paternal and 
maternal genealogy.  This is especially important in tribal societies, where family lineage 
is extremely important, and analysts need to look for bonds or alliances created at the 
tribe, clan, lineage, and family levels.  Social affiliations have so far received the most 
attention in network analyses.  These affiliations include not only ties of friendship, but 
even more importantly, familial relations.  The investigator must not only ask, “Who are 
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the fugitive’s closest friends now, and who were his closest friends when he lived or 
worked in such-and-such a place?” but also, “What is the fugitive’s family tree: is his 
matrilineal side more dominant than the patrilineal side?  Do both sides of his family 
accept him?  What about his wife’s family (or wives’ families)?  What about siblings 
who might be married to people who show up as political or military associates?  While 
records about this may be difficult to construct, birth, marriage, divorce, and death 
records are usually available in the public domain or can be obtained by persuading or 
coercing local administrators or even village elders.  HUMINT collection, by the CIA, 
Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), or third country intelligence sharing can provide 
additional information in this arena. 
2. Educational 
Educational bonds are relationships developed during the sharing or exchange of 
knowledge.  For instance, a PONI who attended a specific university at a certain time 
should have developed a social network at that university.  Therefore, an intelligence 
analyst can develop a target list based on all the students and teachers who attended that 
university during that time.  This does not mean that all individuals who attended that 
university are terrorists, but it does expand the fugitive’s potential social network and 
may reveal important information on the network’s infrastructure.  Also, it is important to 
remember that education and how it is imparted to a person varies according to culture 
and socio-economic status.  For instance, people who live in third world Islamic countries 
and who come from poor families are unlikely to attend government sponsored schools.  
In contrast, families are more likely to send their sons to madrassas to gain a rudimentary 
education.  With this in mind, the analysts must understand and focus on the specific 
characteristics of the PONI’s background so that they can gather relevant educational 
data for analysis. 
3. Political 
Political bonds are bonds based on the manifestation of social power in a society.  
Non-clandestine groups, organizations, and parties are formed to create power through 
numbers.  This power is based on the ability to mobilize group members in support of an 
idea, belief, or cause.  Political affiliations may often link a fugitive to a government 
official or to individuals who can mobilize popular support.  To begin analysis of the 
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political nexus, an intelligence analyst must identify those direct and indirect 
relationships between the PONI and individuals who hold government positions, such as 
town or village council members.  These associations can transcend the local level 
government and manifest themselves at the national level.  The analyst should develop a 
list of political parties and politicians who hold ideological beliefs similar to those of the 
PONI and who may be indirectly linked to him through others.      
Often, the line between politics and religion is blurred.  This is particularly true 
when discussing Islamic fugitives since Islam recognizes no distinction between the two 
(Islamism is often described as political Islam) (Sick, 1993).  The fugitive’s affiliations 
can be found, again, in open sources such as propaganda pieces, party registration 
records, newspaper columns, and the records of political proceedings.  It is vital to 
understand what organizations the fugitive has belonged to.  For example, Usama bin 
Laden’s affiliations with members of the Muslim Brotherhood, certain Salafi groups, and 
Wahabbi clerics all helped him expand his popular support base and lent him a certain 
level of political power within the Islamic world. Who a fugitive associated with, 
campaigned with, or sponsored legislation with can also be telling.  Equally important is 
to pay attention to those persons whom the fugitive opposed or had caustic relations with.   
4. Religious 
Religious bonds are relationships developed inside a religion.  Usually these 
relationships begin at the local church, mosque, or temple.  Yet, religious bonds and 
affiliations can transcend national boundaries. Since religion is so frequently a source of 
identification (among those of like religion) and friction (among those of different 
religions), this category merits careful attention.  For instance, knowing whether a PONI 
professes to be Muslim, Christian, Hindu, etc., is very important since he is less likely to 
find refuge among people of a different religion.  Within the major religions it is 
important to distinguish whether the fugitive is loyal to a particular denomination such as 
being a Sunni, Shiite, or Sufi Islam.  Within that denomination, knowing whether the 
PONI belongs to a sect, sub-sect, or splinter group with a particular ideology can be 





Economic affiliations are the relationships created through economic exchange, 
such as business ventures or charitable organizations.  One should build a list of 
businesses that are either funded by the fugitive or where the fugitive may find work.  For 
example, if the fugitive is a carpenter, he will probably try to find work as a carpenter.  
Similarly, if a fugitive is a philanthropist and enjoys doing charity work for people, he 
will probably be affiliated with other individuals who does similar charity work.  This 
makes it important to ask questions like: who has the fugitive been in partnership with, or 
been employed by, or has made significant or numerous transactions with?  
Another critical component involves tracking the flow of money.   In the case of 
al-Qaeda, the “Golden Chain” has become a common term to describe the network’s 
financial supporters in the Middle East (Eurolegal, 2004).   Again, open source reporting 
offers a tremendous amount.  HUMINT can also yield valuable information, whether 
from interrogations of captured members of the fugitive’s network or intelligence sharing 
among countries that have cooperative agreements in place.   If the fugitive’s network 
does business, or is associated with charitable organizations within the United States, tax 
records and legal documents can provide valuable information about a fugitive’s 
connections. 
6. Criminal 
Criminal bonds are relationships formed within the prison system.  When men 
serve time together in prison extremely close relationships may develop.  Sometimes 
these bonds can be tighter than those in a family or tribe.  With this in mind, analysts 
should ask questions, such as: was the fugitive incarcerated, where was he incarcerated, 
and when was he incarcerated?  Additionally, are there any countries that have 
outstanding warrants for the fugitive’s arrest?   By developing a picture of the fugitive’s 
criminal ties and history, one can map a network of people who the fugitive relies on or 
that he may feel indebted to, or vice versa. 
7. Military 
Military bonds are built through shared combat experiences or military training.  
It is easy to locate those who served in combat together, because there is usually a list of 
veterans that can be retrieved through databases or records.  A tightly knit group is 
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developed through different military experiences with varying levels of commitment to 
each other based on those experiences.  Past military affiliations, such as training 
received, special skills studied, or unit membership, can be used to suggest a fugitive’s 
current relationships   Discovering what campaigns a fugitive fought in (such as 
Afghanistan in the 1980s), and alongside whom, is useful information.  This information 
is most likely to be found on propaganda websites, during interrogations, or perhaps in 
U.S. military or CIA archives that maintain databases on political and military leaders.  
This type of data can also be extracted from foreign government records or local 
knowledge.  
8. Ethno-linguistic / Cultural 
Ethno-linguistic and cultural bonds form because individuals share a common 
language or ethnic and cultural background.  For example, if a fugitive only speaks 
Arabic then it would be difficult for him to have close ties to anyone who does not speak 
his native tongue.  Not all ethno-linguistic and cultural ties are strong, but some are 
crucial to a person’s cultural identity.  In Afghanistan where tribal loyalties are 
fundamental, a Pashtun is far more likely to find refuge in Pashtun-dominated parts of the 
country rather than areas populated by Turkomen or Azeris.  Similarly, if propaganda 
websites retelling the exploits of a PONI indicate that he, as a foreigner, established a 
lasting alliance with a warlord of a certain ethnicity, this information could prove critical 
in narrowing the field of investigation.  The investigator must seek to understand the 
relative strength of such bonds.  Books, reports by investigative journalists, and 
propaganda are useful open sources for such information. 
F. STRENGTHS OF NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY (NT) 
Although NT is a simple and straightforward concept, its strengths are multiplex.  
First, Nexus Topography identifies key social terrain—defined as social elements that tie 
individuals together—that can be used to narrow areas of investigation.  Developing as 
complete a template as possible for a PONI’s potential network should be invaluable 
given the high turnover rate in analysts and the constant effort of maintaining continuity 
in analysis.  Additionally, NT can be used against a variety of PONIs, thereby providing 
analysts with a very flexible tool.  It does not matter if a PONI is a member of a drug 
cartel, terrorist organization, or weapons smuggling outfit since the model provides a 
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standard approach that can be tailored to a specific individual or group simply by 
identifying how individuals are connected.  A by-product of this model is the increased 
efficiency in collection, especially when collection resources are scarce.  As mentioned 
before, the current framework tends to focus mostly on classified information since it 
deals with operational connections.  But, Nexus regions can be researched in the open 
source realm even before classified collection begins.  This, too, can serve to better focus 
limited collection assets or free up resources from other intelligence taskings.   
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VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE 
Any type of analytical process needs systems and an organization to ensure that 
the inputs yield appropriate outputs.  Without an organization that integrates systems, the 
best analytical processes will not achieve their desired outcome.  Therefore, in this 
section we analyze and present a possible organizational structure to support the proposed 
manhunting process.   
The fundamental question concerning manhunting is whether the United States 
government (USG) is properly organized to conduct manhunts?  Currently, the USG has 
no central organization that oversees manhunting.  Apprehending fugitives has never 
been a core competency of either the DOD or any of the intelligence agencies.  
Traditionally, apprehending individuals has been considered a law enforcement function.  
However, criminal cases are man-power intensive, so most criminal investigations focus 
on collecting evidence to issue arrest warrants.  Furthermore, the suspects in most 
criminal cases are concerned not with running from justice, but with concealing their 
connection to the alleged crime.  This dynamic has prevented the law enforcement 
community from developing a centralized organization responsible for all fugitive 
manhunts.  Currently, the U.S. Marshals are tasked by the Attorney General to be the lead 
agency for conducting many of the USG’s fugitive investigations, but not all.  Due to the 
lack of a centralized oversight body, the United States government (USG) has not clearly 
defined the duties and responsibilities between various governmental agencies.  Since 
manhunting is an important aspect in the war on terror, the USG has multiple agencies 
expanding their jurisdictions past traditional organizational roles.  Meanwhile, what role 
should the Department of Defense play in hunting terrorists? 
A. A MANHUNTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Rumsfeld’s War (Scarborough, 2004) contains a 1 July 2002 “snowflake” from 
Donald Rumsfeld to Doug Feith that addresses the issue of manhunting.  In the snowflake 
Rumsfeld asks, “How do we organize the Department of Defense for manhunts?  We are 
obviously not well organized at the present time” (Scarborough, 2004, p183).  One 
difficulty DOD faces in conducting manhunts is that the large bureaucracy does not allow 
sufficient flexibility for such time-sensitive and time-intensive operations.  The 
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Department of Defense is very efficient at waging war, but the organizational structure 
that makes DOD efficient in war also makes it politically inflexible during peace.  The 
U.S. military has made waging war a science, with precise calculations as to how to 
disrupt and destroy the enemy.  Yet, finding a PONI is more an art then science.  To find 
and apprehend a PONI takes creativity and thought.  Some of the most unimportant-
seeming facts are often essential in unraveling where and how fugitives hide.  This is why 
many of the most successful manhunts have been conducted by small flexible units of 
between 3-10 men, the hunt for the Black September Organization (BSO) being a case in 
point.   
In his Master’s thesis, The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic 
Massacre, Alexander B. Calahan compares two Israeli operations, the attempted 
assassination of Ali Hassan Salameh by Mossad in Lillehammer, and the use of the 
Avner Team.  The Lillehammer operation was deemed a failure because it resulted in the 
exposure of seven Israeli officers and the death of two innocent civilians.  The Avner 
team, in contrast, was more successful.  During the two year deployment of the Avner 
team, eight of the eleven targets were killed, and the collateral damage included one KGB 
officer, four PLO security personnel, one freelance assassin, and two team members.  
What separated these two cases was that the Avner team operated outside the 
government’s traditional organizational structure.  This team had the freedom to develop 
the necessary intelligence and conduct the necessary operations beyond the confines of a 
large political bureaucracy.  Due to too much compartmentalization, the Lillehammer 
incident was doomed from the start.  Information that was vital for the mission success 
was rarely shared between individuals.   
Although not all manhunts conducted by large bureaucratic structures are failures, 
cases we have studied show that most successful manhunts involve small flexible teams.  
With this in mind, Figure 7 outlines a potential manhunting organization with operating 
units of 5-7 man teams.  The organization itself would be comprised of a commander or 
director, a deputy director, a staff, an operational research group, a technical support 












Figure 7.   Proposed Manhunting Organizational Structure 
The manhunting teams need to have the authority to directly access various 
United States government agencies.  A DOD manhunting team must be able to work 
directly with personnel for the U.S. Marshals office, FBI, CIA, and the Treasury 
Department.  Each entity would bring different experiences, knowledge, and 
organizational perspectives to manhunting.  The combined effort would ensure that the 
whole would be stronger than the sum of its parts.   
Manhunting requires small flexible units, which can work around various 
limitations placed on a larger centralized organization.  Centralized hierarchies do not 
allow enough flexibility to collect the type of information necessary.  Although large 
bureaucratic organizations are efficient in conducting specified tasks, they often do not 
have the flexibility to adjust to a changing environment.  We would argue that for 
manhunting, an organization’s adaptability is more important than its efficiency.  From 
the cases we’ve studied, adaptability may contribute more to operational success than 
efficiency. 
Individuals who conduct manhunts need to also have a variety of skills in 
interviewing, interrogating, information analysis, and surveillance.  To develop these 
skills sufficiently, officers should not be rotating through assignments every two years or 
so.  By rotating individuals, different hunters acquire different information at different 
times, but the continual rotations cause the loss of some information collected during the 
early phases of the manhunt.  This should be mitigated.  In many ways, the case officer 
model used by law enforcement is optimal since it leads to the development of subject 
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matter expertise.  The lack of law enforcement investigative skills in the military restricts 
the type of information that can be collected on known fugitives, which further limits the 
unit’s ability to locate the fugitive and identify support nodes.   
The manhunting team size may vary depending on the importance and difficulty 
in collecting information on the PONI.  Based on past historical examples, a manhunting 
team should consist of approximately seven personnel, to include operators, intelligence 
analysts, surveillance technicians, and communications specialists, and should have 
enough depth to follow multiple leads.  Specifically, the team should consist of a team 
leader and three pairs of investigators and technicians.  The investigators would be 
operators and intelligence analysts, while the technicians could provide surveillance and 
be responsible for communications.  This set-up would provide flexibility and speed 
since the team leader could pursue multiple leads by deploying his sub-units as he saw 
best. Also, the team members would gain specialized manhunting skills by attending the 
proposed manhunting training course.  This focused, small team effort would also allow 
for the development of subject matter expertise on specific PONIs.   
As depicted in Figure 7, the centralized control unit would consist of the director, 
deputy director, and staff.  This control element would serve to coordinate and integrate 
information collected by the manhunting teams, as well as assigning them their targets.  
Beneath the command element would be the organizational research group, and the 
technical support group.  The organizational research group would collate data into a 
central data bank and would also do high end analysis, to include such activities as link, 
social, and information analysis to support the manhunting teams.  The technical support 
group would then provide the necessary technical support to conduct surveillance and 
communication.  The technical support group would also be responsible for developing 
technologies to be used to target specific PONIs. 
B. AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURE 
Thus far, we have described an analytical process and an organization.  Yet, there 
needs to be some type of procedure that integrates the two.  The diagram in Figure 8 
outlines the organizational procedure or scheme of maneuver for conducting manhunts.  
This procedure starts with the organizational research group (ORG) developing a list of 
Persons of National Interest (PONI).  This list may fall under a tier system, where Tier 1 
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includes the PONIs who are to be either killed or captured.  Tier 2 are those PONIs who 
are to be located and tracked for intelligence collection purposes, and Tier 3 PONI’s are 
individuals whose status is currently unknown and about whom further research is 
needed.   
This list is then given to the director or commander for approval.  The commander 
designates a manhunting team to conduct the manhunt, and provides them with his 
guidance.  The manhunting team begins the manhunting process and generates 
information requirements, leads, and a method of collection.  During this phase, the 
manhunting team coordinates with the operational research group (ORG) and the 
technical support group (TSG).  The manhunting team briefs the commander on the 
information it needs, leads to be followed, and its proposed methods of collection.  
Ideally, the commander will subsequently approve the proposal and authorize the team to 
conduct actions against the information requirements and/or PONI. 
The manhunting team must then begin the investigation.  During this 
investigation, the manhunting team should produce: 1) additional leads that will be 
placed into the queue for further investigation, 2) points of exploitation to gain additional 
information that is not forthcoming by direct interaction with known or past associates, 3) 
the location of the PONI, 4) the identification of additional targets or PONIs.  In some 
cases, the investigation may lead to a dead end, and when this happens, the manhunting 
team will have to reassess its assumptions and information.  The manhunting team will 
then create a new course of action to find the target.   
As shown in Figure 8, the method of investigation or collection is either covered, 
non-covered, or contracted.  In a covered investigation the hunter assumes a false identity 
or uses a cover story to elicit information, which under normal circumstances would not 
be given by the PONI’s friends or family members.  In a non-covered investigation the 
manhunting team represents itself without any false pretext.  In a contracted investigation 
a private organization or company is hired to obtain crucial information. 
For example, the manhunting team can use a cover story to exploit a PONI’s 
parents.  The manhunting team can call the parent and explain that his or her son has a 
refund check pending his signature.  The team can send a small check to the parent’s 
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residence and wait until the PONI cashes the check.  In this case, the manhunting team 
has verified that at least one parent is in contact with the PONI.  The manhunting team 
may also produce a source who has knowledge of the PONI’s location.  This would allow 
the manhunting team to place active surveillance on the PONI and send the necessary 
information to the director.  The director could then initiate a joint planning group to 
conduct a follow-on operation to either track or apprehend the PONI.  The apprehension 
of the PONI can be either covert, clandestine, or overt.  These actions include the use of 
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Figure 8.   Organizational Procedure 
This organizational procedure allows for maximum flexibility for the manhunting 
team while maintaining centralized control.  Additionally, this procedure will also yield a 
set of metrics.  Given the fact that this method is structured around an input–output 
model, it should be possible to measure outcomes.  Studying these outcomes should 
enable the organization to measure its effectiveness in finding and apprehending elusive 
individuals.  For example, Measures of effectiveness (MOE) include the number of leads 
generated, points of exploitation identified, confirmed locations of the target, and the 
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identification of additional persons of interest.  These MOE can then be compared to the 
number of offensive operations that resulted in the successful apprehension of the PONI.  
Correct analysis should identify why certain individuals have evaded capture, and 
determine what types of measures need to be taken to improve apprehension success 





















A. THE FOUNDATION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to explore manhunting, and to develop a 
formal process that can be used by law enforcement, intelligence analysts, and military 
planners to capture Persons of National Interest (PONI) wanted by the United States 
government.  In particular, we have proposed a systematic, future-oriented approach to 
locate and target PONIs.  This involves the development of an analytical process, 
organizational structure and procedures, and the identification of manhunting strategies to 
identify and locate PONIs. 
This thesis represents the first attempt to formalize a process that has traditionally 
developed through years of on the job training (OJT) in the law enforcement community.  
The manhunting process we describe can assist the analyst by providing a systematic 
method for identifying potential hiding locations and see through denial and deception.  
This iterative process will also help the analyst identify key individuals in the PONI’s 
network.  These individuals, once identified, can lead the hunter to the PONI’s location.  
The advantage to this process is that it will yield information that can be graphically 
displayed on a map, thus providing increased clarity.   
One of the key tools we introduce is Nexus Topography (NT)   The intelligence 
community’s current framework to identify a PONI’s network has various shortcomings 
that hinder the analyst’s abilities to find PONIs like Usama bin Laden.  However, using 
NT, intelligence analysts can create a better picture of the PONI’s overall social universe 
by accounting for relationships in terms of time, space, and affiliation.  NT provides the 
intelligence community with a logical, adaptable, and constantly updatable model that 
provides a comprehensive and dynamic map of a PONI’s potential network(s).  
Ultimately, mapping these networks will allow analysts to conduct better targeting of the 
PONI and the subsequent dismantling of his organization 
This thesis also offers an organizational structure and procedure for conducting 
manhunts.  We envision small, decentralized five to seven manhunting teams that report 
to a centralized information collection unit.  A flattened hierarchy of this type is more 
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flexible than current structures within the Department of Defense, but also offers a 
method to monitor the manhunting team, which allows for effective control.   
B. THE ROAD AHEAD 
Although we believe we offer a sound process, much work remains in terms of 
developing a comprehensive manhunting strategy for the United States government.  This 
strategy is necessary if we ever hope to have a robust, coordinated effort at local, 
national, and international levels when it comes to identifying and locating PONIs.  At 
the moment, no one government agency has taken the lead.  No one focuses on bringing 
together what we regard as three key components of an interagency manhunting strategy: 
doctrine, training, and operational structure.   These three pillars need to be researched in 
depth, developed, and then implemented by one lead entity to ensure that a seamless and 
proactive manhunting system is available for American decision makers.  What might 
these three pillars look like?  Although there are a variety of possible answers, the 
following should serve as springboard for further consideration.   
1. Doctrine 
No U.S. governmental agency has yet developed any doctrine on manhunting. 
Although one would expect the Department of Justice to have written rules, procedures, 
or principles on manhunting, so far no such documents have been identified.  Nor has the 
Department of Defense developed any doctrine on how to locate and capture individual 
PONIs.  The apparent lack of doctrine or standardized manhunting procedure calls into 
question the ability of the United States government to target and capture known PONIs.  
Unfortunately, manhunting has also failed to capture the attention of academia.  The 
research that has been done is that undertaken on the job by skip tracers and bounty 
hunters, and the majority of this concerns the licensing and legal aspects of bounty-
hunting.  Consequently, no substantial body of knowledge or collated set of best practices 
exists anywhere.   
The USG needs to develop a basic doctrine before it can begin to enact even an 
initial manhunting strategy.  It would be unwise to devote substantial time, money, and 
personnel unless there was at least some basic understanding of how PONIs hide and 
what tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) truly work against them.  Since these two 
subjects can be researched, an official study needs to be undertaken.  Given time 
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constraints, limited resources, and the organizational culture within the Department of 
Defense, it may make sense to contract out such a study.  Not only should this research 
yield an across-the-board study on how PONIs hide based upon the category of PONI and 
who he is trying to evade—local, national, or international level manhunters —but, 
researchers would need unprecedented access and honest feedback from all agencies 
involved in manhunting in order to gauge current USG abilities.  This could well require 
a Presidential directive.  Regardless, the goal should be to evaluate and draw from the 
raw data a number of working themes that would be consolidated into key principles.  In 
turn, these principles should serve as the starting point for developing a USG manhunting 
doctrine.   
2. Training 
Currently, DOD personnel receive very limited training in the skills necessary to 
be effective manhunters.  The Department of Justice, in contrast, fields the U.S. 
Marshals, who not only have unique skill sets not currently developed or trained by the 
military, but offer a model for organizational structure and procedures.  Skills that law 
enforcement personnel have worth drawing on include being able to conduct interviews, 
detect ambiguities in a story, conduct surveillance, and prosecute investigations to solve 
complex problems.  However, law enforcement in general and the U.S. Marshals in 
particular, do not have much experience operating overseas in diverse and, what are in 
many cases, dramatically different cultural environments.  What may work in the U.S. 
may not be successful in another culture.  In DOD, meanwhile, the holistic sets law 
enforcement possesses are not found in any one person or group.  To the detriment of 
manhunting, DOD separates the intelligence analyst and the operator, and never 
integrates either skill with those of the interrogator and interviewer.  
Given these points, a comprehensive international manhunting training program 
should be established to ensure that the USG has the properly trained personnel to carry 
out its strategy.  The TTPs should be rooted in the doctrinal principles laid down through 
the research described above.  Among those subjects taught should be various 
investigative methods, interviewing skills, surveillance techniques, analytical abilities, 
understanding of the interagency process, and grounding in the legal and ethical issues 
involved in locating and tracking individuals globally.  The training should be hands-on 
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with a focus on using each skill set in a synergistic manner that would be tested in a field 
training exercise (FTX).  The objective should be to produce military personnel who 
could serve as investigators on operational manhunting teams.  Ideally, the military 
manhunter would possess the skills to be able to act as an interviewer, analyst, and 
operator so that he can effectively find his targets without having to rely totally on 
separate independent agencies.  As operational teams provide after action feedback based 
upon their operational missions, this training should be revised and further refined.  So, 
too, should the doctrine.   
3. Operational Structure 
With doctrine and training in place, operational structure—the third pillar of the 
strategy—can be addressed.  The current JTF structure does not address the complexities 
inherent in manhunting.  JTFs are often a collection of independent entities that do not 
communicate effectively outside of their constituent organizations.  Additionally, those at 
the worker level lack an understanding of the strategic goal for their activities due to the 
many layers of mid-level management within the structure.  When individuals lack clear 
guidance, they revert to familiar practices and activities since these fulfill the mission of 
their immediate organization even if they fail the adhoc entity’s overall objectives.  Also, 
existing organizational cultures do not grant sufficient flexibility to collect the type of 
information necessary since they create their own self-inhibiting biases.  Finally, the 
practice of rotating officers over short periods of time through various organizations 
adversely affects the manhunting campaign by removing the subject matter experts from 
the case just as they begin to understand the PONI and his environment.  In contrast, the 
most successful manhunts are historically conducted by small five to seven man units.  
These units have the ability to move quickly and focus on only one issue—finding their 
PONI.  Additionally, they will report to only one boss who understands the necessity of 
allowing the team to dedicate itself over the long term to that single objective.   
With this in mind, a new type of structure is required in order to effectively 
manhunt.  This structure would be two-fold in nature, with one part devoted to a 
centralized command and control entity, while the second part involves small, 
decentralized hunter teams for execution.  As described in this thesis, such a structure 
would not have to be created from scratch.  Rather it could be developed from an existing 
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military organization such as the DIA or USSOCOM.  It should be the one place where 
information from other government entities, such the FBI, CIA, and Treasury, as well as 
traditional intelligence (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, and OSINT), is brought 
together and analyzed.  The reporting chain for the hunter teams would be from team 
leader to action group commander to head of the central command and control entity to a 
national level policy maker.  Ideally, the policy maker would be the President of the 
United States; however, if this was not possible then the Secretary of Defense or the NSC 
should be the minimum level guiding their efforts. 
C. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
Manhunting is about identifying and locating known and unknown persons of 
interest.  Although current events involving the War on Terrorism have much of the 
public relating to manhunting in terms of identifying and locating terrorists, it is 
important to bear in mind that manhunting encompasses much more then just hunting 
terrorists.  It can range from finding war criminals, as in Bosnia–Herzegovina, to finding 
deposed leaders such as Saddam Hussein.  Taken a step further, some of the greatest 
threats to U.S. security in the future will come from small groups of non-state actors or 
even individuals who will move quickly and act independently of governments or large-
scale organizations.  To counter such threats, the USG will need to have the capability to 
quickly and efficiently identify and find these targets globally.  As a result, the United 
States government’s ability to prosecute the war on terrorism today and to find and 
apprehend high value targets in the future depends on the its ability to develop and 
institutionalize a comprehensive manhunting strategy now.  We like to believe this thesis 




















APPENDIX A. ICTY INDICTEE STATISTCS  
Data provided by the Coalition for International Justice.  
Indictees - ICTY  
The 25 known suspects still at-large or otherwise not in the Tribunal's custody 
include Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb army commander 
General Ratko Mladic, all four co-defendants in the Kosovo indictment against Slobodan 
Milosevic, Bosnian Serb General Pandurevic, the Vukovar Three and many others 
accused of genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the 
customs of war, and crimes against humanity.  
Updated: 21 October 2002 
Overview 
Total number of people known to have been indicted at any time  1121
Dead and/or indictments formally dropped 27
     - of these, number killed during SFOR arrest attempts 032
Total number of people now publicly indicted 84
Total number of known indictees at large  25
In the custody of the ICTY or serving ICTY sentence 503
Awaiting transfer to the Tribunal 0
Currently serving sentence 05
Temporarily released by the Tribunal pending trial 09
Released after trial 08
Released after completion of sentence  03
 
Number of Arrests 45 
By SFOR 264
By UNTAES forces (w/ICTY Staff) in then Serb-held Croatia 015
By Bosnian Federation police  06
By police in Republika Srpska 00
By police in Germany and Austria  04
By Serbia 06
By Croatia  03
By Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  00
 






NUMBER OF SURRENDERS 22
Known Whereabouts of Publicly Indicted Persons Still at Large 
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Bosnia: French Sector  
Location Name 
Pale area (RS) (Visegrad and Trebenje)  KARADZIC, Radovan 
 
Bosnia: UK Sector  
Location Name 
Prijedor (RS)  BOROVNICA, Goran 
Busovaca (Fed./Cro.)  MARINIC, Zoran 
Bosnia: Unknown Sector  
Location Name 




Croatia  GOTOVINA, Ante 
Croatia  BOBETKO, Janko 
 
 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
Location Name 
Belgrade, January 2002 RADIC, Miroslav 
Kragujevac, December 2001 RASEVIC, Mitar 
near Belgrade, June 2001  LUKIC, Sredoje 
Serbia, June 2000  MEAKIC, Zeljko 
Belgrade, numerous sightings MILUTINOVIC, Milan 
Serbia, June 2000  JANKOVIC, Gojko 
Belgrade, December 2001  TODOVIC, Savo 
near Belgrade, June 2001  LUKIC, Milan 
Serbia, October 2001  ZEC, Milan 
Belgrade, July 2002 SLJIVANCANIN, Veselin 
Belgrade  PANDUREVIC, Vinko 
Serbia, October 2001  KOVACEVIC, Vladimir 
Serbia, November 2001  MILOSEVIC, Dragomir 
Serbia, June 2001  ZELENOVIC, Dragan 







DETAILS OF ARRESTS 
Name Date/Place of Arrest Arresting Force 
ALAGIC, Mehmed 
(Bosniak) 
08/02/01 Sarajevo  
Bosnia 
Bosnian Gov. (provisionally 
released) 
ALEKSOVSKI, Zlatko  
(ethnic Maced./CR citizen) 04/28/97  Croatian Government 




BANOVIC, Predrag 11/08/01 Serbian Government 
BLAGOJEVIC, Vidoje 10/08/01 SFOR (UK) 
BRDJANIN, Radoslav (BS) 07/06/99 Banja Luka, RS Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
CESIC, Ranko (BS) 05/26/02 Serbia Serbian Government 
DELALIC, Zenjil (Bosniak) 03/--/95 Munich, Germany  German Police, acquitted and released by ICTY 
DELIC, Hazim (Bosniak) 05/02/96 Federation, Bosnia Bosnian Federation Government.  
DERONJIC, Miroslav (BS) 07/0702 Bratunac, RS, Bosnia SFOR (US) 
DJUKIC, Dorde 01/30/96  Bosnian Federation Government 
DOKMANOVIC, Slavko 
(BS) 
06/27/97 Erdut, Croatia (E. 
Slavonia) ICTY/UNTAES, deceased 
DOSEN, Damir (BS) 10/25/99 Prijedor, RS, Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
ERDEMOVIC, Drazen (BC) 03/30/96  Yugoslav Government  
FURUNDZIJA, Anto (BC) 12/18/97 Vitez, Bosnia  SFOR (Dutch, UK Sector) 
GALIC, Stanislav (BS) 12/20/99 Banja Luka, RS, Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
HADZIHASANOVIC, 
Enver (Bosniak) 08/02/01, Sarjaevo, Bosnia 
Bosnian  Federation 
Gov.(provisionally released)
JELISIC, Goran (BS) 01/22/98 Bijeljina, RS, Bosnia  SFOR (US) 
KOLUNDZJA, Dragan (BS) 06/07/99 Prijedor, RS, Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
KOS, Milojica (BS) 05/25/98 Banja Luka, RS, Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
KOVAC, Radomir (BS) 08/02/99 Foca, RS, Bosnia SFOR (German and French, French Sector) 
KOVACEVIC, Milan (BS) 07/10/97 Prijedor, RS, SFOR (UK), deceased 
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Bosnia  
KRAJISNIK, Momcilo (BS) 04/03/00 Pale, RS, Bosnia SFOR (French, German and others, French Sector) 
KRNOJELAC, Milorad (BS) 06/15/98 Foca, RS, Bosnia SFOR (French and German, French Sector) 
KRSTIC, Radislav (BS) 12/02/98 Bijeljina, RS, Bosnia SFOR (US) 




KUPRESKIC, Vlatko (BC) 12/18/97 Vitez, Bosnia SFOR (Dutch, UK Sector)  
KVOCKA, Miroslav (BS) 04/08/98 Prijedor, RS, Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
LANDZO, Esad (Bosniak) 05/02/96 Federation, Bosnia Bosnian  Federation Government  
MARTINOVIC , 
Vinko(BC/C) 08/09/99 Croatian Government 
MILOSEVIC, Slobodan (S) 04/28/01 Belgrade, Yugoslavia Serbia Government 
MRDJA, Darko (BS) 06/12/02 Prijedor, RS, Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
MUCIC, Zdravko (BC) 03/08/96 Vienna, Austria Austria  
NALETILIC, MLaden 
(BC/C) 03/21/00 Croatian Government 
NIKOLIC, Dragan (BS) 04/21/00 Vlasenica, RS, Bosnia SFOR (US) 
OBRENOVIC, Dragan (BS) 04/15/01 Zvornik, RS, Bosnia SFOR (US) 
PRCAC, Dragoljub (BS) 03/06/00 Jelicka, RS, Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
RADIC, MLaden (BS) 04/08/98 Prijedor, RS, Bosnia  SFOR (UK) 
SIKIRICA, Dusko 06/25/00 Prijedor, RS, Bosnia SFOR (UK) 
STAKIC, Milomir (BS) 03/23/01 Belgrade, Yugoslavia Serbia Government 
STANKOVIC, Radovan 
(BS) 07/09/02 Foca, RS, Bosnia 
SFOR (German and French, 
French Sector) 
TADIC, Dusko (BS) 02/13/94 Munich, Germany German Government  
TALIC, Momir (BS) 08/25/99 Vienna, Austria Austrian Police 
TODOROVIC, Stevan (BS) 09/27/98 RS, Bosnia  SFOR (US) - after capture in Serbia by British special 
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forces 
VASILJEVIC, Mitar (BS) 01/25/00 Visegrad, RS, Bosnia 
SFOR (French and German, 
French Sector) 
VUKOVIC, Zoran 12/23/99 Foca, RS, Bosnia SFOR (German (and French?), French Sector) 
DETAILS OF SURRENDERS  
Name Date of Surrender Surrendered to ICTY by:
ADEMI, Rahim  
(ethnic Albanian/CR Citizen 07/25/01 Self 
BLASKIC, Tihomir (BC) 04/01/96  Self 6  
CERKEZ, Mario (BC) 10/06/97  Self * 
FUSTAR, Dragan 1/31/02 Self 
HALILOVIC, Sefer 9/25/01 Self 
GRUBAN, Momcilo (S) 05/02/02 Self 
JOKIC, Miodrag 11/12/01 Self 
JOKIC, Dragan 08/15/01 Self (provisionally released pending trial) 
JOSIPOVIC, Drago (BC) 10/06/97 Self * 
KNEZEVIC, Dusan 05/18/02 Self 
KORDIC, Dario (BC) 10/06/97  Self 
KUNARAC, Dragoljub (BS) 03/04/98 Self  
KUPRESKIC, Mirjan (BC) 10/06/97 Self * 
KUPRESKIC, Zoran (BC) 10/06/97 Self * 
LJUBICIC, Pasko 11/12/01 Self 
OJDANIC, Dragoljub (S) 04/25/02 Self 
MARTIC, Milan 05/15/02 Self 
MRKSIC, Mile 05/15/02 Self 
PAPIC, Dragan (BC) 10/06/97 Self * 
PLAVSIC, Biljana (BS) 1/9/01 Self (provisionally released pending trial) 
SAINOVIC, Nikola 05/02/02 Self 
SANTIC, Vladimir (BC) 10/06/97 Self * 
SIMIC, Blagoje (BS) 03/11/01 Self 
SIMIC, Milan (BS) 02/14/98 Self  
STRUGAR, Pavle 10/21/02 Self (provisionally released pending trial) 
TADIC, Miroslav (BS) 02/14/98  Self  
ZARIC, Simo (BS) 02/24/98 Self  
ZIGIC, Zoran (BS) 04/16/98 Self 
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1 Not including Slavko DOKMANOVIC and Milan KOVACEVIC, who both died while 
proceedings against them were continuing and not including Slobodan MILJKOVIC who 
was reported killed in Serbia on August 8, 1998.  
2 Simo DRLJACA (BS), died resisting arrest by British SFOR forces in Prijedor, RS, 
Bosnia on July 10, 1997; Dragan GAGOVIC (BS), reported by French SFOR to have 
been killed during an arrest attempt on January 9, 1999 in Foca; Janko JANJIC (BS) blew 
himself up with a hand grenade as German SFOR troops tried to arrest him on October 
12, 2000 in Foca. 
3 Not including temporarily released suspects 
4 Including Milan KOVACEVIC, who has since died. Does not include three indictee 
deaths during arrest attempts.  
5 Slavko DOKMANOVIC committed suicide while in detention.  
6 Surrendered after negotiations between US Secretary of Defense William Perry and 
Croatian Minister of Defense Gojko Susak. 
* Surrendered with assistance of the Croatian government, after the US government and 
allies threatened to vote against funding by international financial institutions for Croatia. 
Two other Bosnian Croats, Marinko KATAVA and Ivan SANTIC, also surrendered in 
this group but they were later released after their indictments were dropped due to 
insufficient evidence. 
Sources: Elections results from OSCE; whereabouts from USG map 475416 (R00855) 
2/98; information on arrests and surrenders from ICTY press releases and established 
news sources, including AP, Reuters, and The Guardian.  
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APPENDIX B. MANHUNTING CASE STUDY LIST 
Individual Summary 
Pablo Escobar Famous Columbian Drug lord who turned himself in 
to Columbian Authorities in 1991 to avoid extradition 
to the U.S.  On 22 July 1992, he escaped from prison 
and remained on the run until he was killed by 
Columbian government in a shoot out in December 
1993.  In 1992, the Columbians created a special 
organization called the search block.   Escobar was 
found hiding in a middle class barrio in Medellin 
Columbia.   
Usama bin Laden Leader of al-Qaeda terrorist network who has been 
on the run from U.S. authorities since 1998.  Current 
whereabouts are unknown, but he is suspected of 
being in the Northwest Frontier Province.  Bin Laden 
has evaded numerous assassination attempts on his 
life. 
Mir Amal Kasi Attacked CIA headquarters in 1993 and was 
apprehended in Pakistan in 1997.  He was convicted 
of shooting 5 people outside CIA headquarters, and 
later put to death by lethal injection in the Virginia 
State prison.  Kasi was found in Baluchistan. 
Eric Rudolph In 1998 Eric Rudolph was wanted as a suspect for the 
Olympic Park bombings in 1996.  The FBI conducted 
an extensive manhunt in the mountains of North 
Carolina without success.  After a five-year period, 
Rudolph was picking through trash at a local Sav-A-
Lot, when he was apprehended by a rookie police 
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officer.  Rudolph was sentence to four consecutive 
life terms. 
Pancho Villa Pancho Villa was the first foreign guerrilla/terrorist to 
attack the United States.  In 1916, Villa led 1,500 
Villistas into Columbus, New Mexico and killed 17 
residents.  President Wilson sent General Pershing 
into Mexico to capture Villa.  Unfortunately, the 
Pancho Villa expedition was a failure.  In 1923, Villa 
was assassinated in Parral Chihuahua.  
Black September Organization The BSO was a Palestinian paramilitary organization 
responsible for the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes during 
the 1972 Olympic games in Munich, Germany.  By 
1979, 8 of the 11 members responsible for the attack 
were killed by Avner team created from the Mossad.  
Theodore John Kaczynski Kaczynski was the target of the FBI’s most expensive 
manhunt ever.  Over 18 years, Kaczynski evaded 
identification.  It wasn’t until Kaczynski’s younger 
brother David recognized the handwriting of Ted’s 
manifestos that the FBI was finally able to identify 
the Unabomber.  Ted Kaczynski was arrested in April 
of 1996. 
Abimael Guzmán Abimael Guzmán was the leader of the shining 
path—a Maoist insurgency in Peru.  The Peruvian 
National Directorate Against Terrorism received 
various leads that members of the shining path had 
safe houses in Lima.  The directorate began casing 
various residences, and found empty tubes of cream 
for the treatment of Psoriasis, a skin disease Guzman 
was known to have.  Guzman was arrested in 1992 
and sentenced to life imprisonment.  
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John Dillinger John Dillinger was a famous bank robber in the 
1930s.  Dillinger was arrested on 22 July 1934 after a 
brothel owner, Anna Sage, turned over Dillinger’s 
location.  Anna Sage gave up Dillinger’s location to 
avoid being deported to Romania. 
Ilich Ramírez Sánchez Better known as “Carlos the Jackal” was responsible 
for the attack on the OPEC headquarters in Vienna.  
In 1994, the Sudanese government turned over 
Sanchez to French authorities. The CIA played a 
pivotalrole in finding Sanchez in Khartoum, Sudan.  
A small 4-man element identified Sanchez’s body 
guard near a hospital.  The CIA team confirmed 
Sanchez’s presence in Khartoum, which enabled the 
French to put political pressure on the Sudanese.     
Saddam Hussein On 13 December 2003, the U.S. military captured 
Saddam Hussein in an underground hide site near his 
home in Tikrit.  U.S. forces were able to identify key 
individuals in his support network, which allowed the 
U.S. to quickly close in on his location. 
Ratko Mladic Mladic was the leader of the Bosnian Serb Army and 
is wanted for war crimes by the International 
Criminal Tribunal.  Mladic has evaded capture since 
December of 1995, and is currently suspected of 
hiding in Serbia. 
Radovan Karadic Karadic is the former leader of the Serb Democratic 
Party in Bosnia.  He is currently indicted for war 
crimes by the ICTY.  Karadic has evaded capture 
since the beginning of 1996.  He is currently believed 
to be hiding in the southeast portion of Bosnia 
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Herzegovina. 
Khadaffy Janjalani Khadaffy Janjalani is the leader of the Abu Sayyaf 
Group responsible for capturing three U.S. citizens.  
Janajalani has evaded capture by the Philippine 
government since his escape from prison in 1995.  
Janjalani is believed to be operating in Southern 
Mindanao. 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed KSM is a member of the al-Qaeda network and is 
believed to be the mastermind behind the 9-11 
attacks.  On 1 March 2003, the Pakistani ISI 
reportedly captured KSM in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.  
He was then transferred to U.S. custody.   
Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali) Hambali was the leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah—a 
terrorist network with strong ties to al-Qaeda.  Thai 
police found Hambali in Auytthaya, Thailand just 75 
km north of Bangkok.  The manhunt for Hambali last 
just 20-months, and he is currently detained by the 
United States government. 
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APPENDIX C. DEFINITIONS  
counter-leadership operations 
The employment of strategic forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent, 
selected enemy military, government, or group leadership under any circumstances by 
which hostilities may be initiated. 
 
investigation 
A research process used to collect detailed information on a specific individual, 
group, or organization with the intent to use the acquired information in a follow on 
operation.  An investigation may include traditional intelligence collection functions to 
gather data, but slightly differs in the ability and methods used to question and interview 
selected individuals.     
 
manhunt   
An organized, extensive search for a person of national interest conducted as a 
special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments that employ 
specialized military capabilities to identify, locate, neutralize or capture designated 
individuals.  Manhunts differ from typical surveillance, reconnaissance and direct action 
missions by the degree and methods used to search for, investigate and apprehend the 
targeted individual(s).   
 
man-hunting method   
A specific tactic, technique or procedure used by special operators to identify, and 
locate individuals of national interest.  A man-hunting method may or may not include 
traditional intelligence collection methodologies.    
 
man-hunting team 
An element or unit specially selected, trained and organized to identify and locate 
a person of national interest.  The man-hunting team may or may not be responsible for 
the apprehension of said individual. 
 
Persons of National Interest (PONI) 
Any individual designated by the President of the United States (POTUS) or the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as an individual that poses a direct threat to national 
interest.  Persons of National Interest include, but are not limited to persons indicted for 
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